Where do Sprint and T-Mobile go from here?

After a couple of days of talking to various reporters about the Sprint and T-Mobile news from this week, I thought I’d take some time to write up my thoughts on the situation. I already posted some thoughts on Dan Hesse’s tenure at Sprint here. This has turned into a longish post, so here are some signposts for you: the first section deals with why the Sprint-T-Mobile merger made sense, the second deals with where Sprint goes from here, the third deals with where T-Mobile goes from here, and at the end I talk about other issues relating to T-Mobile, namely the other potential merger offers, T-Mobile’s claim to be the largest prepaid carrier in the US, and its goal of catching Sprint by the end of the year (each of those hyperlinks will take you to the relevant part of the post).

Why the merger made sense

I did a long post previously about why the Sprint-T-Mobile merger made sense. If you haven’t read that, I suggest you do, because I won’t cover the same ground in detail again here and the basic arguments haven’t changed even if some of the numbers have. In brief, Sprint and T-Mobile both suffer from their small scale relative to Verizon and AT&T, which manifests itself especially in advertising spend, network costs, retail distribution and purchasing power. Sprint and T-Mobile have attempted to overcome their ad spend disadvantage through various means, Sprint with its Framily plans, which create a viral effect as people try to sign up friends, family and apparently complete strangers; and T-Mobile with its heavy use of social media for marketing. And SoftBank’s acquisition of Sprint and Brightstar has allowed the combined company to generate greater purchasing power in devices and accessories. But a fundamental and significant gap remains.

This is evident nowhere so much as in the various companies’ margins, as shown below (this chart is an excerpt from the deep dive on US wireless operators’ Q2 performance which I’ll be publishing early next week. A preview is available on FierceWireless now):

Screenshot 2014-08-07 09.57.12As you can see, both T-Mobile and Sprint are languishing in the single digits, while AT&T and Verizon were at around 25% and over 30% respectively last quarter. This is a direct result of their lack of scale, and slow organic increases in subscribers won’t solve this problem anytime soon. This is the single greatest argument for a merger between the two, and nothing else can solve this fundamental problem. The fifth company in the mix there is Tracfone, which is a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO), which piggybacks off the carriers’ networks. Most of its costs are variable rather than fixed, and as such it doesn’t have the same scale disadvantages, but it has to pay wholesale rates to the carriers, which doesn’t allow it to be as profitable as AT&T and Verizon either.

Ultimately, though, the merger faced enormous regulatory opposition, and it was by no means a certainty that it would go through. US regulators would apparently rather see a short-term continuation of the current market structure than a more sustainable long-term competitive environment. I suspect that will come back to bite them a year or two from now. The challenge is that neither Sprint nor T-Mobile is exactly on the brink of collapse today, and so it’s easy to argue the situation isn’t urgent. However, each company faces fundamental challenges beyond those related to scale, and I’ll address those below. Continue reading

Today’s Techpinions post: What does cloud-first, mobile-first mean for Microsoft?

I do a weekly column for Techpinions in addition to my regular stream of posts here on Beyond Devices. Today’s post is about what cloud-first, mobile-first – one of Satya Nadella’s mantras – means for Microsoft. Here’s an excerpt:

The bigger challenge, though, is Microsoft will increasingly be competing against the owners of the two major platforms even as they seek to broaden their offerings onto these platforms. Apple and Google both have their own offerings which compete with Microsoft’s Office, Skype, OneDrive and Outlook.com products. Their competing products are in most cases free to the user, bundled into a broader suite of online services or into a hardware purchase. How will Microsoft compete against these two companies on their own platforms in a way that both adds enough value to justify charging money and overcomes the disadvantages of being a second class citizen? Other commentators are saying Microsoft should abandon both its devices and platforms businesses and focus on cross-platform services, but the fact Microsoft’s two major competitors own those platforms should be cause for reflection.

You can read the full post here.

Evaluating Hesse’s tenure at Sprint

With news today that Dan Hesse is being replaced as CEO of Sprint by Marcelo Claure , I thought it would be worth looking back at Hesse’s tenure as CEO.

An early opinion, from 2008

I dug out an old blog post from 2008 from a now-defunct blog I used to maintain, and it’s worth revisiting. This was just a few months into Hesse’s time as CEO of Sprint, and probably my first close-up encounter with him 1. I quote from that post:

Just got back from [a group] dinner with Dan Hesse, Sprint CEO, at CTIA here in Vegas… My first question was what he had learned about what had gone wrong at Sprint which had led it to the predicament it’s in today.

His main answer was that it ultimately all comes down to the merger with Nextel… The main issues stemmed from the fact that the merger was ultimately billed as, and contracted as, a “merger of equals” because the market valuations of the two companies were similar. This created huge problems, both in terms of the price paid and in terms of the structures and policies which flowed from that decision.

Firstly, in terms of the price paid, this led to massive synergy requirements to provide a return on investment. These synergy targets were overly ambitious and became the driving force for all the other targets at the company. The focus was therefore on massive cost-cutting, was very internal, and ignored external considerations, and especially considerations of customer care, churn and customer service, all of which suffered as a direct result.

The second problem was that the “merger of equals” narrative required an equitable distribution of various goodies after the merger concluded. This included seats on the board and in the senior management roles at the company, which were distributed equally between Sprint and Nextel. The split headquarters between Reston and Overland Park also resulted from this mentality. And it meant that no single unifying strategy led the company during that time, but rather it was constantly torn between the competing visions and philosophies of the people who had brought the two companies together.

From all this flowed the lack of focus on the important things, the over-focus on secondary considerations, and the mess Sprint is in today. Hesse is quickly changing all of this – one of his first moves was instituting greater accountability throughout the business (Gary Forsee had been the only person in the company with P&L responsibility before he left). And he has also made customer care, churn and other external metrics key to incentive structures and reporting throughout the business.

There is still a massive mountain to climb at Sprint, but Hesse certainly seems to have grasped the essential issues and made quick changes which should lead to the kind of turnaround that’s required. It remains to be seen whether the rest of the company can execute on his vision, but it certainly appears to be the right vision in many respects.

Consistent strategic priorities

To an extent that would become even clearer during the course of 2008, Hesse’s hands were tied to a great extent by the mistakes made by his predecessor. But he did the best he could with what he had to work with, and did an amazing job of turning the company around over the next few months and years. He established three key priorities for the company in those first few months, which he outlined at an analyst event I attended in May 2008 (again, quoting from that earlier blog):

Sprint has three clear strategic priorities: fixing the customer experience, establishing a clear brand in the market, and focusing on profitability. This clarity of purpose and focus on fundamentals is a good thing, and the key will be to execute on it without adding a raft of additional initiatives and programs over the coming months. Sprint needs to get the basics right before it gets distracted again.

One of the most impressive things about Hesse’s tenure is that he stuck to these three strategic priorities throughout it, and he reiterated these at the analyst event Sprint held in June this year. Fixing the customer experience, which had become so broken in the time after the Nextel merger, was priority number one, and Hesse made very rapid progress here, by looking at root causes of dissatisfaction and solving those one by one, leading both to increased satisfaction and a smaller call center footprint and staff. By October that year, Sprint was coming first in customer service surveys, a huge turnaround from last place two and a half years earlier. Under Hesse, Sprint transformed its customer experience and customer service, and this helped hugely in returning the company to growth and repairing a damaged brand.

Hesse also worked to personally fix the brand, appearing in commercials for the company to personalize his message of fixing the company and making Sprint great again. I’d argue that advertising was some of the most effective of any ads run by major US wireless companies over the last several years, and certainly Sprint’s most effective ad campaign of Hesse’s tenure. It led with Sprint’s new Simply Everything plan, which offered unlimited voice and data for $99.99, and was emblematic of a theme of simplification across Sprint’s business. Many calls to care involved questions about bills and overages, so Sprint simply moved to plans that were priced simply and didn’t incur overages. This built on Hesse’s history with price plan innovation, which he liked to point out started much earlier at AT&T, with the first 800 numbers, and later with the Digital One Rate plan at AT&T Wireless.

WiMAX – another albatross around Hesse’s neck

Continue reading

Notes:

  1. Throughout his tenure, and throughout my time as an industry analyst, Hesse has been and remains one of the most accessible CEOs in the business, something I’ve been grateful for.

Thoughts on Samsung’s Q2 2014 earnings (and its future)

This is, and isn’t, part of my series on tech companies’ Q2 2014 earnings. It is, because it uses Samsung’s Q2 earnings as a jumping off point, but it isn’t because it’s more of a think piece about where Samsung goes from here than being specifically about one quarter’s earnings.

The importance of Samsung’s mobile business

Having said that, let’s start with those Q2 earnings. Here’s the growth rate in mobile sales specifically (this is part of Samsung’s IT & Mobile (IM) business unit):

Mobile revenue year on year growthAs you can see, growth has slowed dramatically over the last few quarters and dipped into the red in the last two. That trajectory isn’t looking good at all. Now, here’s the operating margin for the IM business unit as a whole (this includes Samsung’s much smaller PC business as well as tablets and smartphones):

IM profit marginThe margin is bouncing around a bit but definitely dropped in the last quarter or so. Longer term, it was somewhat consistently between about 17-20%, but this quarter it dropped to just over 15%. Let’s now put this in the context of Samsung Electronics overall: the two charts below show that IM business unit as a percentage of revenues and operating profits: Continue reading