Category Archives: App stores

Digesting Apple’s new App Store numbers

Note: Following something of a hiatus in late 2015 after the birth of our fourth child, I’m hoping to get back to a more regular publishing schedule here as we kick off 2016. Here’s my first post for the new year, which will hopefully be the first of many. You can see all previous posts on Apple from this site listed here.

Apple today released its customary end of year / holiday period App Store numbers in a press release. By themselves, these numbers are impressive, but it’s important to put them in context to really understand their significance. Today, I’ll share a few charts and other related numbers to evaluate the new numbers and their real meaning.

A quick word on sources

It’s important to note briefly before we start that App Store numbers are one of many data points Apple reports selectively and indirectly. We get these occasional milestone announcements at year end and in keynotes, but between those we’re left to extrapolate and interpolate based on other sources, including Apple’s financial reporting, which has historically provided some direct and indirect guidance on App Store sales. So please bear in mind that while some of the numbers below are based on announcements like today’s, many of them are based on these estimates, extrapolations, and interpolations. I believe they’re accurate, but I want readers to understand they’re not direct from the source.

Today’s numbers

Today’s numbers, in brief, were as follows:

  • “In the two weeks ending January 3, customers spent over $1.1 billion on apps and in-app purchases”
  • “January 1, 2016 marked the biggest day in App Store history with customers spending over $144 million. It broke the previous single-day record set just a week earlier on Christmas Day.”
  • Customers spent “over $20 billion” on the App Store in 2015
  • The App Store has now paid out “nearly $40 billion” to developers since it launched in 2008, and over a third of that was paid out in the past year.

There were also some numbers about jobs and job creation, but those won’t be the focus of this post.

Putting the numbers in context

So let’s put those in context. Focusing just on the numbers Apple has reported directly, here’s the picture on the cumulative payments to developers, ending with today’s “nearly $40 billion” (which I’ve pegged at $39 billion):Cumulative payments to devs as reportedUsing my estimates for the periods not directly reported, we get this smoother and less patchy version, which also goes back to the inception of the App Store in 2008:Cumulative dev payments estimatedAs you can see, it’s a lovely curve, with what appears to be accelerating growth. In fact, we can look at that growth more easily by charting trailing four-quarter payments instead, as follows:Four quarter dev payments estimatedWhat you see here is that the growth has been fairly steady for the last few years, since about 2013, with the occasional bump here and there. Apple’s annual run-rate for payments to developers is now around $14 billion, which translates into the “over $20 billion” customer spend number in today’s press release. That’s an enormous revenue number for something which is effectively a feature in Apple’s platform.

Longer-term patterns

If you look again at that last chart, though, you’ll see that the early history is less consistent. There are some ups and downs in the early years, though they’re a little hard to make out in that chart because of the sheer scale of payments in the later years. One way to dive deeper into this and to look at the longer-term trends is to use another set of numbers – the base of iOS devices in use – to put these figures in context. Here, again, we have to make certain assumptions about the size of that base, but we have enough data points to be reasonably confident there too.

The chart below shows the average annual revenue per iOS device in use since the inception of the App Store:Four quarter revenue per iOS device estimatedWhat you see in the chart is a series of different eras in the history of the App Store in which the trends were quite distinctive. In the early going, spend quickly leveled off at around $15 per year per iOS device, and it then began to falter a little. Apple introduced in-app purchases as a new feature in late 2009, and that seems to have sparked a slight renaissance in 2010, along with the launch of the iPad and some higher-priced apps which launched for that platform. However, by 2012, this number was back in decline, likely as the base of iOS devices diversified beyond early adopters and into new markets with lower spending power. In fact, that is the trend you’d expect to see over time, as existing users make do largely with apps they already own, and as new users in new geographies join the base.

However, what you actually see is that, starting around late 2012, the number starts rising significantly, eventually leveling off again at around $25, significantly higher than in the early years of the App Store. What drove this growth? I mentioned already that in-app purchases launched in late 2009, but it wasn’t until late 2012 that Candy Crush Saga launched. Of course, one app didn’t change the trajectory of the whole App Store, but this app exemplifies a new business model that’s become increasing prevalent – even dominant – in the App Store, and in App Store revenues. Many others have followed a similar path to monetization since then, and I suspect it’s the rise of in-app purchases in games that’s driven that growth since late 2012. I’ve written about the rise of these games, and some of the unpleasant economics associated with them, elsewhere, but there’s no doubt they’ve had a significant impact on the App Store and its revenue composition.

There’s no doubt that games in general, and those featuring in-app purchases in particular, are a major driver for the App Store growth Apple trumpets on a regular basis. The two big questions that arise out of all of this are whether Apple wants to continue to rely so heavily on a model that has unsavory characteristics, and whether in focusing on this dominant category it’s neglecting other business models in the App Store. That latter topic is something we’ve discussed a couple of times recently on the Beyond Devices podcast, most notably in Episode 24.

Why Windows 10 can’t fix Windows Phone

Ahead of Microsoft’s next reveal of Windows 10 later this week, lots of blogs and news outlets are talking up the promise of the new operating system to unify the PC and mobile versions and in the process “solve the app gap”. Most of what I’ve read, though, seems to look straight past a huge flaw in this whole concept, one that I’ve talked about several times in other places (notably in my in-depth Windows Phone report from a few weeks back – available here for free).  As such, I wanted to just quickly lay it out here for simplicity and clarity.

First, the theory: in Windows 10, Microsoft is creating a single operating system which will run across different form factors, with much of the underlying code shared and the rest tweaked by device type and size. This will allow developers to create apps which run 90% of the same code, with just some customizations for different device types and sizes. This, in turn, will allow Microsoft to tap into the vast number of Windows PC developers, who will now be able to port their apps to Windows Phone will very little additional work, which will drive a large number of new apps to the mobile platform, reducing the app gap relative to iOS and Android.

However, there’s a fundamental flaw in this argument, which is that the apps Windows Phone is missing simply don’t exist as desktop apps on Windows. Just think about it for a moment, and you’ll realize it’s empirically obvious: almost all the apps which are most popular on mobile are in one of these categories:

  • Games, which dominate the app stores, and tend to be mobile-only in many cases
  • Properties which exist as websites on the desktop and only exist as apps on the mobile side
  • Properties which are mobile-first and/or mobile-only, such as Instagram, Vine, Viber and so on.

But we don’t need to rely on gut feel here – it’s very easy to do the analysis. I’ve pasted below two small thumbnails which you can click on to expand to full size. They show tables for the top free iOS and Android apps as of today, according to App Annie. Against each of the apps I’ve completed several more columns to reflect the following data:

  • Is the app already in the Windows Phone store?
  • Is there a desktop app on Windows (any version, not just Windows 8)?
  • Is this an app which is actually a website rather than an app on the desktop?

I’ve then done some filters in the following columns to answer each of the following questions:

  • Of those apps which are not on Windows Phone today, are these available for Windows PCs today?
  • Of those apps which are not on Windows Phone today, are these available as a website on desktop?
  • Of those apps for which there is a desktop app on Windows today, are these also available on Windows Phone?

You can go ahead and have a look at the tables to see the results for yourself (they should open in a new window or tab by default):

Screenshot 2015-01-19 09.54.42Screenshot 2015-01-19 09.54.57

But here’s the summary:

  • Among the top 50 free iOS and Android apps, there is not one which is not on Windows Phone but exists as a desktop app on Windows
  • Among the top 50 free iOS and Android apps, there are a handful which exist as websites but not as desktop apps (almost all owned by either Google or Apple)
  • All of the top 50 free iOS and Android apps for which there is a Windows desktop app already exist as Windows Phone apps today.

In other words, if the theory is that sharing a code base across desktop and mobile will lead to desktop apps being ported to the mobile environment in greater numbers, within this sample at least this has no applicability at all. All the apps available on Windows PCs are already available on Windows Phone. A handful of the rest exist as websites on the desktop, but the vast majority simply don’t exist today on any flavor of Windows.

There are two important caveats here. Firstly, this analysis only looks at the top 50 apps, and a different pattern could theoretically emerge if one were to examine a longer list of apps. However, from what I’ve seen the patterns are broadly similar, and the same conclusions would apply. Secondly, this analysis focuses on the most popular apps, which are naturally dominated by consumer-facing applications and not those used in the enterprise. I do believe that there are cases where desktop apps exist for enterprises but not yet for Windows Phone, and in this case the theory behind Windows 10 may well have at least some applicability. But that’s a far cry from saying that Windows 10 will help to solve the app gap, which is fundamentally a consumer problem, not an enterprise one.

Having said all this, I’m very curious to see what Microsoft has to say this week with regard to the mobile flavor of Windows 10 in particular. I think it’s getting a lot right in Windows 10 more generally, but the real solution to fixing Windows Phone lies in making the platform more compelling to consumers, and not just at the low end where it’s currently so focused.

For further reading on Windows and Windows Phone:

An archive of all my previous posts from this site on Microsoft is here.

The limited opportunity for app install ads

Today, Twitter formally introduced its new mobile app install ads product, joining Facebook and Google in what is becoming a crowded space, with Yahoo apparently waiting in the wings too. I had a quick look at this space in the context of Facebook’s Q1 earnings a few weeks ago, but wanted to drill down deeper, especially now that we know more about app revenue through Google Play. The upshot of all of this is that the opportunity for mobile app install advertising, though growing rapidly, is not big enough to provide a significant revenue stream for all these companies. In other words, there’s gold in them there hills, but not enough to justify the gold rush we’re seeing into this space.

First, a quick primer on mobile app economics. Some of the major app companies are public, and report data themselves, while several third parties also report data on the topic regularly, allowing us to draw a few conclusions:

  • Revenue from advertising is a factor for some apps, but the vast majority of revenue today (likely between 80% and 90%) comes from pay-per-download and in-app purchases. As such, the revenue numbers for the two major stores – Apple’s App Store and Google Play – likely account for a significant proportion of total revenues from apps 1.
  • Developers pay Google, Apple or other stores 30% of their gross revenues from these stores, keeping 70% for themselves. Thus, if they’re to make a living, it will be by keeping their other costs contained within that net revenue figure. That needs to cover development costs, ongoing operating costs (salaries, hosting, care, etc.), and costs to promote apps.
  • Sales and marketing costs for most successful app makers sit between 10% and 20% of gross revenues. App install advertising will come out of this budget, and may indeed make up most of it. This percentage may be significantly higher for apps early in their lifecycle and therefore promoting themselves heavily without yet seeing significant revenue, but it will tend to return to that average over time.
  • Thus, anywhere between 40% and 50% of a typical app developer’s gross revenue may go to the store commission plus sales and marketing, leaving about half for all the other costs of running the business.

Given these facts, let’s look at total gross revenue opportunity from the two major app stores. I’ve added 15% to my estimated gross revenue from the two stores to account for the advertising opportunity.

Total app store revenues from Google Play and App StoreNow, let’s think about the size of the market for mobile app install ads, which as we’ve already said will have to come out of that sales and marketing budget. To put it in context, we’ll compare it to Facebook’s mobile advertising revenues, since Facebook is the largest player in this market today and a substantial proportion of this revenue comes from app-install ads today. In the chart below, I’ve plotted Facebook’s mobile ad revenues against two views of the app install ad opportunity – one a bull case and one a bear case. The bull case assumes that the app install opportunity is 25% of total gross revenues, and adds 15% to store revenues to account for ad revenues. The bear case assumes that the app install opportunity is 15% of gross revenues, and adds a smaller 10% to store revenues to account for ad revenues. My own view is that the bear case is likely closer to reality. Continue reading

Notes:

  1. For simplicity’s sake, I’m excluding the revenue opportunity through other stores, because they account for a tiny proportion of overall revenues. Adding them in would not significantly affect the numbers.

What we learned at I/O about Google’s app revenue

With both Apple and Google’s developer events behind us now, we have some useful new numbers to play with, specifically on the amount both companies have disbursed to developers. In today’s Google I/O keynote, Google announced that it had paid developers $5 billion over the past year, and that this was 2.5 times what it had paid developers in the previous twelve-month period. This gives us some really good numbers to start plotting overall Google Play developer payments for the first time. The Wall Street Journal also reported today that Google is now retaining almost all of its 30% cut, as does Apple, rather than giving the majority to carriers as it once did. This, in turn, allows us to calculate Google’s revenues from Google Play as well.

Google is catching up quickly in payments to developers

First, a comparison of quarterly developer payments on both platforms. I’ve filled in the blanks with a nice smooth curve on the Google Play numbers, and although my fairly accurate estimates on the iOS side are pretty lumpy too I’ve smoothed that curve as well to make them easier to compare. (The reality is developer payments go up and down because app spending goes up and down as new devices ship and are sold in large numbers around major launches and the holiday period, for example.)

So here’s a chart comparing developer payments from the two companies since the inception of their respective paid app stores:

Google and Apple developer payments Continue reading