Category Archives: Google

Alphabet, Earnings, Google, Other Bets, Q4 2015

Breaking down Alphabet’s Other Bets

February 1, 2016 Jan Dawson

Alphabet (formerly Google) just reported its first results under its new operating structure, which means that it separated out its “Other Bets” from core Google results, at least for the last five quarters and the last three full years (I wish the company had provided more quarterly results – year on year growth and similar trends are hard to divine with so little data). I’ve just finished putting together my quarterly deck on Alphabet for subscribers (sign up here), and I thought I’d break out some of the charts on the Other Bets specifically for blog readers. Most of these charts (and many others on the rest of Alphabet’s business) are in the deck.

Revenues

The first thing to talk about is revenues – Other Bets revenue is tiny in the context of Alphabet’s overall results. I had to adjust the scale of the chart below to start at 90% just so it would be visible (and it’s still just a tiny stripe at the top of each bar):Other Bets revenue is under 1% each quarter and each year so far, and it was well under 0.1% of revenues for the year 2013. It’s growing, albeit unpredictably – as CFO Ruth Porat mentioned on the earnings call, these Other Bets are inherently volatile, and so revenues are best looked at on a twelve-month basis. Revenue for 2015 as a whole was just $448 million.

To put that in context, the three biggest revenue generating businesses in the Other Bets segment are Nest, Google Fiber, and Verily (the life sciences business). That likely puts Nest revenues at under $300 million for the year, Google Fiber at $100-150 million, and Verily at some smaller amount still. Given that these are only three of the businesses under Other Bets, that means everything else generates minimal or no revenue. Interestingly, these likely aren’t the three businesses with the biggest expenses, but we’ll come to that in a minute.

Profitability

Next, let’s look at profitability. Whereas Other Bets revenue basically doesn’t show up on a to-scale chart of Alphabet revenues, its operating losses certainly do:As you can see, operating losses were very significant in the Other Bets segment. The segment lost $1.2 billion in Q4 2015 alone, and three times that much in 2015 as a whole. For context, sometime in 2005 or 2006, that was about as much operating income as the whole of Google was throwing off over a comparable period. It’s about 15% the scale of the core Google segment’s operating profit today, but negative. And it appears to be growing fairly rapidly, since this loss almost doubled year on year while revenues only grew by 37%.

To compare Google’s segment margin with the margin for Other Bets, I had to use a two-axis chart, because the contrast is pretty stark (Google’s operating margin is shown in blue against the left axis, while Other Bets is dark gray and on the right axis).
Alphabet segment margin

Expenses

What, then, is driving these huge losses? Sadly, Google doesn’t break out R&D spending by segment, but I would assume a great deal of the costs in this part of the business would be accounted for under that line in the income statement. The chart below shows Other Bets segment losses and total expenses (i.e. losses plus revenues) as a percentage of Alphabet’s total R&D, as an interesting exercise:Depending on which measure you use, Other Bets expenses were equivalent to between a quarter and 40% of Alphabet’s total R&D spend in 2015. That’s not to say that they actually accounted for that much of R&D spend – given that Nest and Fiber likely have substantial costs in non-R&D buckets, it’s likely less than that. But given how much of Other Bets’ total expense is likely in non-revenue-generating efforts like self-driving cars, I’d bet a lot of that expense is R&D.

Capital spending

Another interesting way to look at all this is capital spending, which Alphabet does break out for the new segments. On the earnings call, Ruth Porat said the majority of Other Bets capex goes to Google Fiber. How much does Other Bets spend on capex?As you can see, unlike revenue, capital spending by Other Bets is visible in the context of overall company spending – again, Other Bets punches above its weight in this category. For further context, look at capital intensity (capex/revenues) below: Google’s capital intensity is shown on the left in this chart, and as you can see it’s been falling steadily over the last year or so, landing at under 10% in Q4. By contrast, Other Bets’ capital spending has been over 100% (i.e. it spends more on capital expenses than it generates in revenue) for all five reported quarters. If we take the bare minimum estimate of capex spent on Google Fiber (i.e. 50% of total capex), that still means that it spent $435 million on capex in 2015 while generating $100-150 million in revenue.

Trajectory

We’ve taken a look at several aspects of Alphabet’s Other Bets segment, but we’ve only touched on perhaps the most important element: trajectory. In other words, which direction are these numbers heading in? In brief, using Ruth Porat’s suggestion to look at annual results:

Revenue is growing, at about 37% year on year from 2014 to 2015
Operating losses are growing faster, from $1.9 billion in 2014 to $3.6 billion in 2015
Margins are worsening too, from (and these numbers are a bit ridiculous) -488% in 2014 to -685% in 2015
Capex is growing faster than revenues on an annual basis, and capital intensity rose from 150% in 2014 to almost 200% in 2015.

None of those is moving in a happy direction as far as the future financial performance of Alphabet is concerned. There is some evidence that Porat’s arrival precipitated some tougher decision making regarding the Other Bets and that some of these numbers began to improve in late 2015, but it’s too early to tell how much of the apparent improvement is real and how much is the volatility she talked about. What is clear is that Google is spending massive amounts on these efforts, and generating very little revenue today. The prospects for Nest and Fiber as revenue generators and profitable businesses are not great, especially given that massive capital expenditure, so it will be the other businesses that will need to justify this investment. My bet (no pun intended) is that we’ll see increasing pressure for Google to provide more detail on what’s going on behind these numbers, and to have more to show for this massive investment, over the coming year.

Adoption, Android, Apple, Google, iOS, iOS 8, iOS 9, Microsoft, Mixpanel, Operating Systems, Windows

Operating system user bases

October 7, 2015 Jan Dawson 4 Comments

Related: two previous posts on the patterns in Android adoption rates (December 2013, March 2014), a post contrasting iOS and Android adoption patterns, and a post from last month on iOS 9 adoption.

Both Apple and Google have just updated their mobile OS user stats, while Microsoft shared a new number for Windows 10 adoption at its event this week, giving us a rare opportunity to make some comparisons between these major operating systems at a single point in time. We now have the following stats straight from the sources:

The stats provided by both Apple and Google on their developer sites with regard to the user distribution across their mobile operating systems (Android and iOS)
The 110 million Windows 10 number provided by Microsoft this week
The 1.4 billion total active Android user base number provided by Google at its event last week
Total Windows users of around 1.5 billion, as reported by Microsoft several times at recent events.

In addition, there are various third party sources for additional data, including NetMarketShare and its estimate of the usage of other versions of Windows. Lastly, I have estimated that there are roughly 500 million iPhones in use now, and around 775 million iOS devices in use in total (including iPads and iPod Touches).

If we take all these data sets together, it’s possible to arrive at a reasonably good estimate for the actual global user bases of major operating system versions at the present time. The chart below shows the result of this analysis:There are several things worth noting here:

Each company has one entry in the top three, with Microsoft first, Google second, and Apple third.
However, only one of these entrants is the latest version of that company’s operating system (iOS 9), while the other two are the third most recent versions (Windows 7 and Android KitKat).
Google has three of the top six operating systems, none of which is its latest operating system (Marshmallow, released this past week). Even its second most recent version (Lollipop), now available for a year, is only the third most adopted version after KitKat and Jelly Bean.
Both iOS 9 and iOS 8 and the three most used versions of Android beat out every version of Windows but Windows 7.
The most recent versions of the three companies’ major operating systems are used by a little over 400 million (iOS 9), 110 million (Windows 10), and a negligible number (Android Marshmallow) respectively.
The second most recent versions are used by around 330 million (Android Lollipop), around 250 million (iOS 8), and around 200 million (Windows 8) respectively.

There are lots more data points to tease out here, but to my mind it’s a striking illustration of the differences in the size and adoption rates of these three major operating systems.

Two additional thoughts

Just for interest, I’m including a couple of additional thoughts below.

First off, here’s the same chart, but with iOS reduced to just the iPhone base. The order changes a fair amount, but iOS 8 and iOS 9 still make a good showing:

Lastly, I wanted to revisit my post from a couple of weeks ago about the initial adoption of iOS 9, especially as it relates to Mixpanel’s data. In that post, I showed how Mixpanel’s iOS adoption data tends to be pretty close to Apple’s own data except for the month or so after a new version of iOS ships, when it tends to skew way lower than Apple’s own data. Now that we’re a few weeks on from the initial launch, and Apple has released the second set of iOS adoption data since the launch, I wanted to revisit that pattern. Interestingly, the very same pattern is playing out again – despite the initial significant discrepancy, Mixpanel’s data is now once again very close to Apple’s own:

Google, Hardware, OnHub, Quick Thoughts, Routers, Smart home

Quick Thoughts: Google’s OnHub router

August 31, 2015 Jan Dawson 2 Comments

It looks like a slew of reviews of Google’s OnHub router have come out in the last 24 hours or so, so I’m guessing some sort of embargo has lifted. It seems the reviews are decidedly mixed (which feels par for the course today for products both good and bad, as reviewers each seek to find something unique to say, often overreaching in search of something worth praising or criticizing). Glenn Fleishman has an interesting review of reviews of sorts at TidBits, which is worth reading for its own sake and for the links to other reviews.

What I wanted to write up here quickly isn’t a review (I don’t have a review unit) but some other related thoughts I’ve had about the OnHub router since it was announced, and which have been reinforced by reading some of these reviews. We discussed some of this on the Beyond Devices Podcast a few weeks back, the week the router was announced, but I’ll probably go a bit deeper on some of it. I’ll embed the podcast episode at the end of this post too.

A router for novices at a power user price

One of the things that struck me off the bat, but has really been brought home by these reviews, is that there’s a fundamental mismatch between the price positioning of this router and the target audience. The whole value proposition (at least for today – and we’ll come back to this) of this router is that it’s enormously simple to use. And yet it’s priced at $200, the same sort of range as the high-end routers in the market. The Wall Street Journal review notes some interesting trends in the router market, which I think serve as useful context for this device:

Cable companies and other Internet service providers now rent their customers basic Wi-Fi routers when they sign up for service. As a result, U.S. router sales have fallen from 6.1 million year-to-date in 2012 to 3.5 million in the same period this year, market research firm NPD reports… NPD determined that the average selling price is on the upswing. Cheap routers aren’t selling so well, but higher-end models… are. “People are willing to pay a lot of money—more than before—for an AC router with significantly better performance than they had in the past,” said Mr. Baker.

Here’s the thing: I’m betting that the kind of people who are willing to pay a lot of money for “an AC router with significantly better performance” are not the kind of people who feel intimidated by those routers. They’re the kind of people who know enough about routers to understand what distinguishes 802.11ac from some of the older technologies, and who are likely pretty comfortable customizing the various settings. And yet Google’s router is priced in this same range and yet removes many of the typical settings available to power users in other routers in that category. You can’t specify separate SSIDs for the 2.4GHz and 5GHz bands, you can’t get into a web interface, and many of the other deeper settings you can configure on almost any other router. This is a router for novices sold at a power user price point. As such, it’s likely to please neither group.

This is further reinforced by the fact that the router is clearly something of a trojan horse for Google in the home automation space, given the inclusion of Bluetooth and Zigbee, and yet again those users are likely to want far more control over their routers than the OnHub provides. Some of this may be solvable in software down the line, but I suspect Google’s whole mentality around this router is wrong, and that can’t be fixed by software updates.

A symbol of Google’s disjointed approach

To my mind, the OnHub router is also a symbol of Google’s disjointed approach to so many of its projects, and I worry that the Alphabet reorg will only make things worse. Google already has a home automation business, Nest, which not only makes its own products but has been the vehicle for both making further home automation acquisitions (Dropcam) and for acting as a hub for other home automation gear (the Works with Nest strategy). And yet, this product isn’t branded Nest, nor does it apparently sit under Tony Fadell’s hardware group, which also includes Google Glass. In fact, Mark Bergen of Recode and Amir Efrati of the Information have both suggested that this product actually came out of the Google Fiber team. I’ve written previously about how disconnected from the rest of Google the Fiber project has seemed, and it’s ironic to now see Google proper appropriate this technology just as Fiber is being hived off into a separate Alphabet company. The good thing about Google is that people throughout the organization feel free to experiment with various things, some of which eventually become products. The bad thing is that this means you could have several separate teams working on similar things in isolation, and in some cases you end up with several products apparently chasing the same use case (e.g. the Nexus Q, Chromecast, and Google TV/Android TV).

The naming of the OnHub router, the subdomain on.Google.com, the naming of the companion app (Google On), and so on all suggest that this is the beginning of a broader strategy (and we already know that there will be another router made in partnership with Asus). But this is yet another effort within Google to tie together the different devices in the home. Why isn’t it owned by Nest? How will it relate to Android TV and Chromecast, Google’s other living-room projects? So many questions, and so few answers…

The theory and the reality

One other thing Google has touted as part of its positioning for the OnHub is this idea that it is pretty enough to sit in the living room. This, too, feels like a very Googley statement – I’m not sure how many people with real design sense would actually want even a relatively good-looking router in their living rooms. But it’s also a bit of a non-starter as a practical matter – the router doesn’t stand alone – it needs both a power cable and an ethernet cable to function, and you’ll seldom find both of those in the middle of a living room. You’ll at least have power outlets in the wall, but your cable modem is likely to be in a closet somewhere rather than in your living room. And with only one jack in the back of the device, you’re going to need a switch somewhere else anyway for the rest of your hardwired devices, another example of the mismatch between functionality and pricing.

I could go on with all this, but you get the idea. Though an interesting product, the OnHub feels like it falls short on the theory alone, let alone the reality (where several of the reviews suggested it falls down too, even on the most touted features). But it also feels like it’s emblematic of several of the key challenges Google has – too many experiments and projects that are poorly coordinated, poorly thought-through, and ultimately poorly executed. I’m not convinced that the Alphabet structure will help with any of this, and in fact it’s quite likely that it will make the fragmentation problem worse rather than better.

Alphabet, Berkshire Hathaway, Big picture, Google, M&A, Management

Making sense of Google’s Alphabet move

August 10, 2015 Jan Dawson 5 Comments

This afternoon, Google announced a restructuring of its business which will eventually see the current core Google business sit as a subsidiary within a new parent company called Alphabet. Google’s blog post about the move is here, and the SEC filing with some additional details and legalese is here.

Berkshire Hathaway remarks in context

This move finally puts the comments Larry Page made recently about Berkshire Hathaway in context – I wrote about those remarks previously here. As a reminder, Page had said to some shareholders that he saw Berkshire Hathaway as a model for Google to emulate, and in that piece I wrote about all the ways Google isn’t like Berkshire Hathaway, and why that model would be wrong for Google, and yet here we are facing the prospect of a conglomerate called Alphabet owning Google and a variety of other unconnected businesses.

The reasons for the move

There are two ways to explain this move. The first can be described as personal: Larry and Sergey have quite clearly been increasingly uninspired by merely running a search engine and advertising business, and this finally aligns their job titles with what they actually want to spend their time doing. It also gives Sundar Pichai a well-deserved promotion and presumably prevents him from leaving for a CEO job somewhere else. However, it would be an irresponsible thing to do to restructure a company as huge as Google simply to give three individuals the jobs they want.

Hence, we have to look at financial reasons, and I think there are a couple of them here. Firstly, this is kind of like Amazon’s recent AWS move in reverse. When Amazon broke out AWS in its financial reporting recently, it took a small but rapidly growing part of the business that was buried in the overall financials and allowed it to shine in its own right, rather eclipsing the core business in the process. Google has to some extent the opposite problem: its core business is massively profitable, but it has a growing number of non-core businesses which are masking its true performance. By breaking out the core Google business and the rest in its financial reporting, Google allows the core business to shine (I’d expect that core business to have better profitability and potentially growth numbers than Google as a company reports currently). By contrast, it will finally become clear quite how large and unprofitable all the non-core initiatives at Google are, which might well increase pressure from shareholders to exit some of those businesses. I suspect that the positive reaction in the stock market to today’s announcement is a sign that Larry Page and others have signaled to major shareholders that something like this would be happening.

The other financial reason is that separating subsidiaries in this way loosens the organizational structure and allows much easier addition and subtraction of those entities – in other words, acquisitions and spinoffs. Until now, any large acquisition contemplated by Google had to be absorbed by the core business or awkwardly separated out as Motorola was during its brief time at Google. Neither is ideal, but allowing acquisitions to sit in an “Other” bucket at Alphabet corporate level while leaving Google intact and separate might be a more attractive way of managing acquisitions going forward. At the same time, any subsidiary that either becomes so successful that it’s worth spinning off as its own company or comes to be seen as non-core is much more easily disposed of because it’s already operating somewhat independently.

A conglomerate needs an investment strategy

As I mentioned in that earlier piece, one of the biggest problems with seeing Google as a conglomerate is that it doesn’t share one of the key characteristics of other conglomerates: its subsidiaries are able to operate independently. Yes, it’s clear that Larry Page wants Google’s various subsidiaries to be operationally independent, with their own CEOs making decisions about their businesses, but it’s also clear that in the vast majority of cases they won’t be able to financially independent. In other words, those CEOs who are supposed to be independent will be going cap-in-hand to Alphabet management every quarter asking for more money to fund their operations.

But to my mind the bigger issue is that, as Google shifts from being a single company to a conglomerate, a mission statement such as organizing the world’s information needs to be replaced by an investment strategy, and it also needs an investment manager. One of the defining characteristics of Berkshire Hathaway is that it’s very transparent about the principles on which it’s managed (see the Owner’s Manual written by Buffett in 1999). Its management is both highly skilled in making investments but also highly focused on achieving specific financial goals with those investments. By contrast, it’s not clear that Larry Page or any of the other senior managers at Google has this skillset, or that there’s any investment strategy here other than doing things that Larry and Sergey find personally interesting or “important and meaningful” (to borrow the phrase they use in the blog post). That’s a poor guide to an investor as to how to think about the company and its financial performance going forward. The restructuring won’t happen until later this year, but one of the things that Google’s management will have to do between now and then is explain what their investment strategy is.

A quick note on transparency

I’ve seen some people suggesting that Google will provide more reporting transparency as a result of this move. That’s true, but only insofar as Google will now report the part of the company that’s still called Google as a separate entity from the rest. As Mark Bergen reports at Recode, only Alphabet and Google will report their results – the rest will presumably just be in a big pile called “Other”. I’d assume that the Google segment will continue to break out the Google Websites, Network, and Other buckets as at present, but anyone hoping for more data on the performance of Android, YouTube, or other bits of that Google business will likely be disappointed. It’s going to continue to be as opaque as it always has been, I suspect.

Berkshire Hathaway, Big picture, Google, Management

Google isn’t Berkshire Hathaway

July 14, 2015 Jan Dawson

Update: given Google’s Alphabet announcement on August 10th, I’ve written a new post which refers back to this one. You might like to read that one too.

That’s likely an odd title, but both the title and this post were prompted by a paragraph in a Wall Street Journal article about Google ahead of its earnings later this week. The paragraph, which references remarks made by CEO Larry Page at a meeting with large shareholders back in December, reads as follows:

Mr. Page said he looks to Berkshire Hathaway Inc., the insurance-focused conglomerate run by billionaire Warren Buffett, as a model for how to run a large, complex company, according to people who were at the meeting. Mr. Buffett has a cadre of CEOs running operating companies and doles out capital from the holding company to these businesses based on their performance each year.

I first saw references to this paragraph on Twitter, and subsequently decided to read the whole thing. While the tenor of the article overall is very much in keeping with my own views on Google (it seems to be facing increasing headwinds and is doing a poor job of explaining how it will weather them), this idea attributed to Page struck me as particularly odd, and somewhat worrying. And the simple reason is that, even though it’s perfectly normal (and sensible) for CEOs to seek to learn from other CEOs how to run their companies, Google is nothing like Berkshire Hathaway, and indeed it shouldn’t be. Below, I’ll outline several reasons why I find Page’s remarks concerning.

Berkshire Hathaway is a conglomerate

I don’t know any more about Berkshire Hathaway than the next person – it’s simply not a company I’ve spent a huge amount studying. But I have learned enough previously (and researched enough today) to provide a brief primer. First off, Berkshire Hathaway is, famously, a conglomerate. That means, in part, that one of its defining features is that it’s a very diverse business with many unconnected parts. Wikipedia’s definition is likely as good as any (emphasis mine):

A conglomerate is a combination of two or more corporations engaged in entirely different businesses that fall under one corporate group, usually involving a parent company and many subsidiaries.

Berkshire Hathaway itself wonderfully fits this description. Though the Journal article describes it as “insurance-focused”, in reality BH’s assets are incredibly diverse, including Dairy Queen (a restaurant chain), Fruit of the Loom (clothing), a railway, energy companies, half of Heinz, a whole range of others and, yes, a sizable insurance business. Many of these businesses are indeed run entirely at arm’s length, and they can be because they have no connection with each other. They can also be run in this way because they’re all profitable in their own right (at least at a divisional level), and so don’t need the other subsidiaries to prop them up. The only real connections between BH’s various businesses are the 25-strong headquarters staff and the fact that the company uses the “float” (the premiums received but not yet paid out on) from the insurance business as a cheap source of investment money for the other businesses.

Google is not a conglomerate

On, then, to Google, which I know and understand much better and which is very different from Berkshire Hathaway. There are several key points here:

Firstly, Google isn’t a conglomerate – its businesses have hitherto had fairly strong connections with each other, and in some cases a very strong connection. At a basic level, almost all of Google’s businesses (until relatively recently) have been Internet services businesses, and even all its current businesses are at least technology businesses. That, alone, makes them far less diverse than most conglomerates, and than the the definition above suggests.
Secondly, although Google has many products and services, it doesn’t have “many subsidiaries” – these products and services have largely been interconnected, as I just described, and as such can’t simply be treated as a series of subsidiaries to be managed separately, as Berkshire Hathaway’s various assets can.
Thirdly, the pieces of Google aren’t and can’t be independent in the way BH’s various businesses are, because many of them (including some of the largest, such as Android and YouTube) simply aren’t profitable in their own rights. Though the management of some of these bigger parts can be given a measure of autonomy, they can’t run anything like BH’s various subsidiaries can because they rely on the other parts of Google to stay afloat.

I’m not sure which explanation for this disconnect worries me more – either Larry Page doesn’t understand these important differences between Google and Berkshire Hathaway, or he’s planning to turn Google into a true conglomerate along the lines of BH. Neither seems like a good sign. I’ve already talked about the first of these, so let’s tackle the second. Though some of Google’s recent acquisitions haven’t fit with certain popular visions of what Google is as a company, I believe they all fit if you look at the company through the right lens: as a machine learning and artificial intelligence company (something I wrote about in detail in this piece). I think there are still concerns about Google, as I said at the outset, but I don’t think over-diversification is one of the biggest.

However, if Page really is planning to build a conglomerate, that’s even worse news. For one thing, he’s absolutely the wrong guy to run it if he’s using Warren Buffett’s model as his ideal. Warren Buffett is, above all, a very shrewd investor, and Page’s major acquisitions have been anything but shrewd from a financial perspective. But using Google as a vehicle for further investments also doesn’t seem like a good idea, regardless of who’s running it. Conglomerates are notorious for diminishing rather than enhancing the value of their subsidiaries, and Berkshire is the exception rather than the rule (and Buffett has articulated clear reasons why).

The one way in which Google could be like Berkshire Hathaway

There is one small way in which Google might be like Berkshire Hathaway, and that’s the fact that Google, like BH, has one part of its business that generates significant sums of money that can be used to invest in the rest. At BH, this is the float – not technically profit, but still cash on hand that can be invested elsewhere. At Google, it’s the search advertising business that is Google’s profitable core. However, unlike BH’s insurance float, which seems fairly safe for the time being and has been steadily growing over the years, Google’s core business seems increasingly threatened, and it’s not clear that any of its other businesses are in a position to supplement or supplant it as a major source of revenue in the near future. The key difference, then, remains that BH uses its float to invest heavily in businesses that are already successful, whereas Google invests its profits into businesses that need the money just to run, because they’re unprofitable.

I think the most charitable reading of Page’s remarks is that he only sees Buffett’s model as a guide at a very superficial level – of giving his various direct reports a certain amount of autonomy. I certainly hope that’s what he meant by the comparison, because almost any other reading of them is worrying, to say the least.

Broadband, Google, Google Fiber, TV

Google Fiber’s real innovation

July 6, 2015 Jan Dawson 1 Comment

I’ve written about Google Fiber just once before, and that was to talk about my installation experience when I briefly lived in one of the very few areas where the service is available, in Provo, Utah. However, today I wanted to unpack something different about Google Fiber, in part in response to some recent articles I’ve seen, such as this one. These pieces often cite competition from Google as the major factor in a perceived shift in the status of broadband in the US, and that isn’t quite what’s happening. I would argue that Google has had a significant impact on the rollout of broadband in the US, but mostly not because of direct competition.

Maps tell part of the story

As I mentioned in that opening paragraph, Google Fiber is actually available in very few places today. Here’s the map from Google’s Expansion Plans page:

The company being most aggressive currently with rolling out gigabit services is AT&T, and here’s its equivalent map:

Note, first of all, that both companies have the same three categories – cities where they offer service today, cities where they will definitely launch in future, and cities which are in an exploratory stage. That’s something that we’ll come back to later.

But the second thing to note is that, of the 27 metro areas listed in total on the two maps, just seven appear on both maps, with the other 20 being mutually exclusive. Yes, you can absolutely make the argument that AT&T is responding to competition from Google in some of these markets, notably Austin (the same goes for some of the incumbent cable operators). But in a majority of cases, AT&T is launching or contemplating a launch in cities where Google isn’t present. So, though Google helps to explain why AT&T is launching gigabit service in some markets, it’s clearly not the whole answer.

Google’s real innovation: turning the model on its head

In what sense, then, is Google having a significant impact on the market? Well, the answer is that the key innovation Google brought to the broadband market has nothing to with technology and everything to do with business models. Essentially, it turned the traditional model on its head. If you’re not familiar with how broadband and TV operators usually roll out service, here’s how it’s traditionally worked. The provider approaches the municipality where it wants to offer service, and requests permission to do so. The municipality then extracts every possible concession from the potential provider before finally (if the provider accedes to the terms) granting permission. These concessions have typically included minimum coverage requirements, free access for schools, libraries and the like, carriage of local content on TV services, and so on. Essentially, providers have traditionally had to bribe municipalities with a variety of goodies just to get permission to offer service, and then have often still had to work very hard to get access to infrastructure needed to roll out the service.

Enter Google. Google’s process, of course, was entirely different: it essentially announced a competition for a city to become the first Google Fiber location, and invited cities effectively to bid for the privilege. What happened as a result was that over a thousand cities across the US applied, and Kansas City was eventually chosen. In the process, Google turned the usual model on its head – instead of municipalities extracting concessions from Google to roll out fiber, Google would extract concessions from cities for the privilege of having Google Fiber rolled out. Cities wouldn’t impose any “redlining ¹” restrictions, they’d smooth the path for Google to build the necessary infrastructure, and so on.

The first reaction of Verizon and AT&T, which had just spent painful years getting franchises in many individual municipalities for their fiber rollouts, was outrage. However, their second reaction was far more productive, which was to say that they, too, would be willing to roll out such services if cities would offer them the same terms and concessions, starting with Austin, Texas, where AT&T was one of the incumbent operators. Though this claim was met with some initial skepticism, AT&T has since followed through not just in Austin but in a number of other cities where Google isn’t present at all. AT&T, then, has benefited enormously from Google’s business model innovation, which allows for a demand-led rollout facilitated rather than held back by local municipalities. And it’s this innovation which has allowed AT&T to rapidly expand its GigaPower services to many other cities too, well beyond those where Google is competing with AT&T. (Verizon, of course, had largely completed its FiOS rollout by the time these changes happened, and so wasn’t able to take advantage of them in the same way).

Rollout details

As I close, I’ll return briefly to something I asked you to note earlier – the three categories of cities both Google and AT&T list on their maps: open markets, announced markets, and markets under consideration. This is a critical part of this whole model, and the innovation Google brought to the market, because the markets under consideration are those currently being invited by the two companies to make big enough concessions to make a rollout worthwhile. The same process that got Google Fiber into Kansas City is now being repeated across the country by AT&T and Google in very much the same way.

What’s very different between the two companies, though, is the way they treat those first two groups, and Austin is a great case study of this difference. Google announced the Austin market in 2013, and now has one neighborhood (or Fiberhood, to use Google’s terminology) up for sale. Four other neighborhoods are listed as under construction, while “Rest of Austin” (the vast majority of land area in the city) is described as “coming soon”. Contrast this with AT&T, which made a rushed announcement within a week of Google’s, but completed its 1 gigabit rollout by September 2014. AT&T’s big advantage, of course, is that it already has a network and lots of customers in Austin, and in almost all the other cities where it will launch GigaPower service. This obviously dramatically speeds up the rollout, and in almost all cases will mean that AT&T is way out ahead of Google even in cities where the two compete. (In Austin specifically, the fact that AT&T owns a lot of the infrastructure Google needs access to for its rollout has been another significant factor).

Closely connected to this is the size of the cities these two companies are targeting – though Google has tended to focus mostly on second-tier cities in its early rollout, AT&T is already in Chicago, Miami, Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, and has other major cities like LA, San Francisco, and San Diego on its exploratory list. Again, when you already have a network, contemplating a rollout in a major metropolitan area is much more palatable than if you’re having to start from scratch. So, AT&T’s launched cities see far greater availability more quickly, but its announced cities are also likely actually see gigabit services widely deployed far faster than Google’s.

So, in the end, though Google spearheaded this move to gigabit broadband, it’s quickly ceding the market to others, and especially AT&T, which are piggybacking off its business model innovation and rolling out services much more quickly. In the end, though, perhaps that meets one of Google’s original goals very effectively, and perhaps better than Google’s own rollout could have done. After all, one of the major drivers behind Google’s rollout was improving broadband access across the US.

Notes:

Redlining is the name given to the practice of excluding certain neighborhoods from an infrastructure rollout on the basis of lower incomes, lower propensity to pay, or for other reasons, which has traditionally been banned by municipalities requiring universal access. ↩

Advertising, AOL, Google, Microsoft, Quick Thoughts

Quick thoughts: Microsoft’s ad business

June 29, 2015 Jan Dawson

Given today’s news about Microsoft selling its display ad business to AOL and in turn replacing Google as the search advertising provider for AOL, I thought I’d quickly revisit some of my earlier analysis on Microsoft’s ad business.

By way of background, Microsoft has never directly reported the financials for its advertising business, but it has provided enough detail in its past financial reporting that I’ve been able to build a pretty good picture of this business over time. This past quarter, perhaps as a precursor to today’s announcement, Microsoft stopped providing any sort of information about its display ad business, but here’s a quick view of my estimates of Microsoft’s two major ad revenue streams over the past couple of years:

As you can see, Search advertising has been growing very well indeed, almost reaching the $1 billion per quarter mark last quarter, and likely to hit it very shortly, especially with the help of the AOL deal. By contrast, though, Display advertising has been heading south for some time now, and was under a quarter of a billion in revenue for each of the last two quarters of 2014. The split between the two, then, is roughly as shown in the chart below:In other words, search advertising was not only vastly outperforming display advertising in growth terms, but as a percentage of Microsoft’s overall online advertising business. As such, it’s made sense for some time for Microsoft to jettison this part of the business in favor of focusing on the part that’s working: search advertising. Part of the reason for the disparity between the two is general industry dynamics – display has been struggling for other companies too, while search continues to be one of the most effective forms of advertising and to command commensurate rates. Microsoft’s display ad business, though, was also sub-scale, and hadn’t made the transition to mobile devices and native advertising effectively. Search, meanwhile, has benefited both from positive industry trends and the growth of Bing and Yahoo’s growth in search market share in the last couple of years.

The impact on Google

AOL’s decision to switch from Google to Microsoft is not enormously impactful on Google by itself, but in the context of Firefox’s earlier switch to Yahoo as its default search engine in the US, and the potential for a much more significant switch away from Google by Apple sometime this year, it’s part of a drumbeat of bad news for Google. One of Google’s challenges at this point is that it’s come to compete with many of its erstwhile partners, with Apple as perhaps the most striking example, and it’s arguably starting to pay the price for that strategy.

Apple, Developer events, Developers, Google, Microsoft, WWDC, WWDC 2015

Ten quick thoughts on WWDC

June 9, 2015 Jan Dawson

Yesterday was a busy day, as these keynote days always are – several hours of waiting around with very little to do, followed by several hours of frenetic activity both during and immediately after the keynote, as I prepare a quick comment for reporters, talk to some reporters, and do quick write-ups for clients. I feel like my head is still spinning, and although I have a variety of things I want to write about, I don’t feel quite ready to do a deep dive on any of them yet. As such, I’m going to do something a bit different – post several short thoughts here, some of which I may expand on with proper blog posts later, and some of which we may talk about on the Beyond Devices Podcast later this week (we’ll be recording Wednesday and the podcast will hopefully go up Thursday).

Music majors on what I said it should

Apple Music majors in part on what I said it should in this piece I wrote back in April – that is, it differentiates partly on the basis that it gives you a single home for your existing collection of music and the new stuff you access through the service, with the ability to easily add new material to your library. I also said in that piece that I thought Apple Music might be most relevant to older folks with more money than free time, and that still feels right.

Beats 1 is a weird hybrid

Beats 1 is a funny mix – neither algorithmic curation nor human, personalized curation, but generic human curation, just like traditional radio. To my mind, Beats 1 is the strangest part of the Music launch – the piece that feels like it doesn’t belong, and perhaps was Apple’s desperate attempt to provide a headline feature to set Apple Music apart from other subscription music services. In my mind, it wasn’t needed – as I said above, I think Apple Music already differentiates itself in the most important way. Then, behind Beats 1 is now hiding a series of more customizable radio stations, which used to be known as iTunes Radio. Lumping all this together as radio also feels like it might be confusing, but at least iTunes Radio is being infused with some Beats smarts, which should make it better. I also wonder if Beats 1 is a concession to trying to appeal to the younger crowd, despite the older appeal I think most of Apple Music will have.

Connect feels more significant

On the other hand, Connect feels more interesting, and more unique. Whereas Spotify (and to a lesser extent Deezer, Rdio etc) has always seemed the target (victim?) of Apple Music, Connect feels like it’s going after SoundCloud and YouTube, where many undiscovered artists make their start. The problem today is that once an artist breaks through they tend to withdraw from these platforms and become increasingly distant from fans. Some artists (Taylor Swift seems a great example) maintain a direct connection with fans through social media, but for many others there’s this disconnect. I feel like Connect could be the first platform that gives artists a home that will work whether they’re undiscovered in their bedroom or coming off a platinum record. Connect also feels like a big tool for appealing to younger users.

The Music launch should have been its own event

Music was the “one more thing” at the end of the keynote, but it really didn’t fit there – in days past, this launch would have had its own event (likely in the fall, Apple’s traditional time for such events), but instead it was squeezed in here. This was a mistake – it didn’t do the service justice, and the Music segment felt rushed and cluttered, but still left all of us somewhat unsure about exactly how it works. It really should have been its own event, separate from WWDC (which is, after all, a developer conference, and there’s no developer angle to Apple Music – yet).

Developer events are getting cluttered

This brings up a broader point – each of the major developer events – Microsoft’s Build, Google’s I/O, and Apple’s WWDC – feels increasingly cluttered. As the aspirations and reach of these companies grows, a single annual two-hour keynote is becoming an increasingly poor way to communicate all that needs to be communicated. Microsoft does two keynotes, which is one way to deal with the problem (Google has done this in the past). But it just highlights the degree to which this two month period in the late spring is becoming a huge pile-up of news, that doesn’t really serve anyone well. All three companies should be thinking about spreading this stuff out more.

The Apple TV news merits its own event too

Speaking of all this, where in the world would Apple have fit the three major pieces of Apple TV news at this year’s WWDC? With a keynote that already felt light on detail and rushed, how could it ever have hoped to also announce new Apple TV hardware, and Apple TV SDK, and the Apple TV service? Thankfully, we didn’t have to find out, and that will likely all be announced together at a later date. I just hope it won’t all be crammed into September’s iPhone event. Perhaps the iPad event in October?

Native apps on Watch are the biggest developer news

Although iOS and OS X are the two big focus areas for WWDC each year, to my mind the most significant news by far was watchOS 2, and especially the ability for developers to create native apps and tap into the hardware and software features of the Watch directly. I’ve always felt that third party apps will be a huge part of the mainstreaming of the Apple Watch (just as they were for the iPhone and iPad before it), but the early model of companion apps and WatchKit just wasn’t going to cut it. I see a huge swathe of much more compelling Watch apps later this year when watchOS 2 becomes available, and I think we’ll see a huge growth and broadening of the appeal of the Watch as a result.

Google and Apple did stability releases while Microsoft goes big

There was some interesting timing this year at the developer events – Apple did its big overhaul of iOS in 2013 and OS X in 2014, while Google also did its major overhaul of Android in 2014. This year, both these companies focused on stability releases with relatively incremental improvements and lots of polish. By contrast, Microsoft is releasing its biggest Windows upgrade in years, across all device categories. I haven’t yet thought through all the implications of that (beyond mere intellectual curiosity), but it’s interesting to ponder.

Siri advancements reinforce Apple’s privacy stance

The Siri announcements were a wonderful validation of the piece I published last week on Apple and privacy. In that piece, I wrote that nothing in Apple’s privacy stance should prevent it from being able to do clever and useful things in iOS and beyond to better serve users with machine learning, and its WWDC announcements reinforced that. Enhancements in Siri and Spotlight are the best examples, but the natural language processing improvements in multiple individual apps are part of this broader picture too.

Apple is retaking control of content

Apple has been big in content for twelve years, since the launch of the iTunes Store in 2013, and continuing with major launches like TV shows and movies in iTunes, iBooks, Newsstand, and so on. However, for the last several years Apple has seemed adrift in content, a victim rather than a driver of trends, and has seen its content revenues stagnate and fall even as third party apps explode (along with the associated revenue stream for Apple). This year, Apple finally seems to be retaking control of control, with the News app, Apple Music, and presumably the Apple TV service later this year. Apple finally seems to be embracing subscriptions in music and video, and recognizing that some of its other content platforms (notably Newsstand) aren’t working and rethinking them. News puts it uniquely in control of a certain form of content, while Music also gives it some unique ownership of artist-created and DJ-created content, which is a fascinating shift.

Android, Developer events, Google, Google I/O

Evaluating Google’s I/O 2015 announcements

May 29, 2015 Jan Dawson

I wrote a piece a few days back for Techpinions about the challenges Google needed to address at I/O this year. Now that the I/O keynote is over (which I was fortunate enough to attend in person), I thought I’d revisit that list of challenges to see how Google did.

Retaking control of Android

There were a couple of things that Google did related to retaking control of Android at I/O: reinforcing the value proposition of its Android One initiative, and announcing Android Pay. The former is obvious: it’s Google’s attempt to get a close-to-stock version of Android as the default version in emerging markets. But the latter may be less obvious. However, by launching Android Pay, Google nixes its OEMs’ efforts to introduce their own payment systems, as this post outlines. Samsung is likely to be the hardest hit by this, since it’s the only Android OEM that had launched a payment service. But I wonder how much Google will spread this model of Google Services Mandatory classification for key Android features to other areas, squeezing out OEMs from offering competing services.

Defending the web against apps

This year’s I/O was a mixed bag in this respect, with a couple of initiatives clearly aimed at just this, but some others moving things in the opposite direction. On the one hand, Google announced Chrome Custom Tabs, an alternative to in-app browsers for displaying web content, which brings users back into the web, where Google can better track their activity and otherwise capture data. It also reiterated its app indexing and deep linking projects, which recently began to roll out on iOS too. These efforts are both aimed at making the web more relevant in a world where apps are becoming dominant. Google Now on Tap is an interesting mix in this respect – on the one hand, it allows users to stay in apps when they have Google Now queries, rather than having to exit out of them, which could be seen as favoring apps rather than the web. But on the other hand, this inserts a Google layer between users and apps, in some cases recommending other apps for users to open, but in others using the Google Knowledge Graph to disintermediate those apps. On balance, Google seems to be serving its own needs pretty well with these new announcements.

Convince developers Android users are worth targeting

There was remarkably little at I/O about why developers should target Android users exclusively or in addition to iOS users. There was no update on the total number of Android users, which remains at “over one billion”. And Google did very little to argue why these users might be attractive, rather emphasizing the fact that many of the new users on Android will come from emerging markets, where there are lower incomes and less propensity to spend. There was no mention of carrier billing at all, and the only mention of monetization was in relation to better ad products within apps rather than paid apps or in-app purchases. I don’t think Google has given up on the paid apps route, but it was hard to escape that impression from the keynote, which I find baffling. To be sure, Android will never have the same attractive demographics as iOS, but it can still do much better than it has in the past, especially in mature markets.

Take Android beyond personal computing devices

The big announcement here was the Brillo project, which takes Android and strips it down to a barebones version for use in Internet of Things devices (and for today at least home devices specifically), together with the Weave communication protocol, which will be baked into Android at the Google Play Services layer and therefore make compatible devices instantly discoverable from Android devices. This is exactly what I was getting at in my preview piece on this topic – a version of Android that’s optimized for these devices, which have no need for the full version of Android but have other specific needs Android in its current form doesn’t meet well. There’s a lot of work still to be done here – though Brillo will launch in Q3 (and Weave in Q4) I sensed many decisions about Brillo still haven’t been made (not least the final name for the OS itself). More broadly, I was disappointed that we didn’t hear more about operating systems for the car, another area I highlighted in my preview piece, and one in which Google has been reported to be making some interesting progress. I wonder if we’ll see more on this in the months building up to the Android M public release.

Demonstrate a clear value proposition in TV

This was the other big area where I was expecting much more from Google’s keynote at I/O than we got – it got barely a mention in the keynote, and the expected announcements were made either not at all or in press releases. Nvidia announced its Shield device built on Android TV, and bought up almost every outdoor advertising spot within a few blocks of the Moscone Center to advertise it, but there was nothing in the keynote to demonstrate meaningful progress in this area. The only other concession to this challenge was the announcement that HBO Now would be coming to Android and Chromecast shortly. Speaking of which, Chromecast has now sold 17 million units, putting it in the same ballpark with Apple TV and Roku. There continues to be an odd disconnect between Chromecast and Android TV in Google’s TV strategy which I hope it can resolve in time. Chromecast certainly seems to be the more successful model so far, though the total number of casts (1.5 billion) relative to the number of Chromecasts sold (17 million) implies relatively low usage of those devices.

Continue to unify Android and Chrome OS

There was even less on this theme at I/O 2015 than there was last year, where Google at least talked about Android apps running on Chrome OS. Chrome OS was barely mentioned at all in the keynote, and there was no news about it at all. This continues to be an area where Google has to do a much better job telling its story and bringing the disparate threads together.

Differentiate against Amazon and Microsoft in the cloud

The whole enterprise space, and cloud in particular, got incredibly short shrift in the keynote too, after a lengthy session in last year’s keynote. There was nothing here to indicate that Google was going to make meaningful progress in this department in the coming year beyond its existing strategies.

Beyond the keynote, and beyond Android

Even though the pace of the keynote and the volume of individual announcements was somewhat overwhelming, as always, the substance of what was announced really wasn’t. The Android M release looks like a very modest, incremental, improvement on Lollipop. This was a little disappointing, but partly reflects the fact that Google is slowly extracting functionality from the operating system and putting it in more easily upgradable layers like Google Play Services instead. The new Photos app is a great example of this. This does mean, however, that the news around new Android version releases is going to become less interesting over time, while the announcements separate from Android will become more interesting in many ways. But this year’s I/O also looks like introducing much more news outside the keynote – I’m writing this on day two of the event, and several announcements around wearables, Google Loon, and other projects have been made separately. As an attendee, I’m grateful that the keynote was trimmed down to just two hours, but it does make it harder to follow all the news that’s coming out of I/O as Google starts to fragment the more notable announcements across sessions.

Adoption, Android, Android versions, Apple, Google, iOS, iOS 8, Smartphones

Contrasting iOS and Android adoption patterns

April 10, 2015 Jan Dawson 10 Comments

I’ve done two previous posts (here and here) on Google’s Android developer dashboard stats, and I was surprised to find it’s been just over a year since my last one. I may still do a deeper dive revisiting some of the points from those previous posts, but this time around I wanted to do something different – contrast Android and iOS adoption patterns. Google has published data on Android version adoption for quite some time now, but Apple’s only been doing it for the last couple of years, so we have less data. But we still have enough from both platforms that we can draw some interesting conclusions.

iOS adoption – huge initial ramp plus slow conversion

The pattern for iOS adoption is very clear – a massive initial ramp in adoption in the first few days and weeks, followed by a steady conversion over time. The chart below shows the share of the base on each version in the first 24 months from launch:

As you can see, by the time the first month is over, more than 50% of the base is already on the new version, and it ramps to around 90-95% by a year later, just before the next version launches. At that point, it immediately drops to 25-30% as the new version takes over, and slowly dwindles from there down to under 10% after two years. There are differences in adoption rates for the various versions shown – as has been reported, iOS 8 has seen a slower initial adoption rate than iOS 7, though it’s now over 75%. Correspondingly, the share of iOS 7 has fallen slightly more slowly than iOS 6 did, though the gap in both cases has closed a bit recently. Continue reading →