Category Archives: YouTube

Google’s Increasing Reliance on its Own Sites

After a couple of weeks on vacation, I’m still playing catchup with some of the tech earnings reports that came out while I was gone. Today, I’m tackling an interesting aspect of Alphabet’s earnings, which is the increasing dominance of ad revenue from Google’s own properties versus revenue from third party sites as a proportion of its total ad revenues. The charts I’m using here are largely taken from the Alphabet deck in the Jackdaw Research Quarterly Decks Service, which you can sign up for here. We also discussed Alphabet earnings along with those of other major tech companies on this week’s Beyond Devices Podcast.

Some quick definitions

First off, some quick definitions. Google divides its ad revenue into two categories:

  • Google websites – this includes all revenue from Google’s own websites, including AdWords revenue that is generated on Google.com, advertising revenue generated on YouTube,  and advertising revenue generated from other Google owned and operated properties like Gmail, Finance, Maps, and Google Play.
  • Google Network Members’ websites – this includes AdSense,
    AdExchange, AdMob, All DoubleClick-related revenues including DoubleClick Bid Manager revenues, and Other Network products including AdSense for Domains.

Within the core Google segment, these two divisions plus the “Other” category make up the entirety of revenue, and ad revenue from these two sources makes up 90% of Google segment revenue.

Very different growth rates lead to increasing dominance by Google’s own sites

These two segments have been growing at very different rates over the last several years, with Google’s own site revenue growing much faster than its Network Members’ ad revenues, as shown in the chart below:

Google ad segment growth Q2 2016 560px

Though there have been a couple of brief periods (in 2009-2010 and 2012) when Network revenue grew faster than Google website revenue, the pattern has otherwise been fairly consistent: Google’s revenue from its own sites has grown faster. Over the last three years, the gap has been significant – Google website revenue is up 74% over that period, while Network Members’ revenue is up just 17% over three years. That leads to a business that’s increasingly lopsided in favor of Google’s own sites:

Google ad revenue split Q2 2016 560px

In Q2 2016, Google sites passed 80% of total Google ad revenue for the first time. That’s up from 70% in 2011, and 60% around 2006.

Paid clicks growth is the driver

The reason for this discrepancy becomes abundantly clear when you look at the ad metrics Google provides. Every quarter, it reports growth in the number of paid clicks and the cost-per-click (i.e. price) for both the Google sites business and the Network Members business. These numbers bounce around quite a bit, but I find it’s often helpful to index the numbers to a certain point in the past to see the longer-term trends. The chart below shows these figures indexed to the quarter two years ago, Q2 2014:

Google ad metrics Q2 2016 560px

As you can see, there’s a stark contrast between the two businesses here. Let’s start with the number of paid clicks:

  • Google sites paid clicks are up 61% over two years (the number was 67% last quarter)
  • Network paid clicks are at 98% of where they were two years ago, and this number has been relatively flat over that whole period.

Google says that growth in clicks on its own sites has been driven by a combination of growth in the adoption of YouTube engagement ads, improvements in ad formats and delivery, and expansion of products, advertisers and user bases across all platforms, particularly mobile. There simply aren’t similar drivers for the Network business, which Google obviously doesn’t control as directly, and which is in some ways much more mature.

Looking at the cost per click:

  • Google sites CPC in Q2 2016 was only 76% of the CPC for two years earlier
  • Network CPC was 95% of two years earlier, and again this number has been relatively flat over the period, with modest growth in the first year, followed by slight shrinkage since.

The reason for the falling cost per click on Google’s own sites is largely due to growth in YouTube engagement ads where cost-per-click is lower than on Google’s other platforms, as well as changes in property and device mix, product mix, geographic mix, and ongoing product changes, with a smaller impact from currency exchange rates. Some of the same factors drove the modest recent decline in Network CPC as well.

Traffic Acquisition Costs and margins

This all matters a great deal for a couple of reasons, the second of which we’ll come onto in a moment. But the single most obvious reason is that the economics of ad revenue from Google’s own sites is radically different from the economics for Network sites, and that’s because of how Google pays for traffic. On third-party sites, Google pays out most of the revenue to the site owner, whereas on its own sites it keeps the vast majority of the revenue. Google breaks out the traffic acquisition costs (TAC) for both these segments, and the stark differences are shown in the chart below:

Google TAC by segment Q2 2016 560px

As you can see, in the Network business, Google pays out at a rate very similar to the economics of the major app stores, at about 70% of revenue. For its own sites, however, Google’s TAC is a fraction of that, at around 9% in Q2 2016. These payments go to the sources of traffic to Google’s various websites, principally makers of browsers including Apple’s Safari which feature Google as a default search engine.

Interestingly, Network TAC had come down quite a bit for several years, but has recently spiked back up a little, though it’s been within a range from 67-71% for the last five years. Conversely, Google’s TAC for its own sites has been steadily rising, as its cut of revenues under various placement deals has been shrinking. With competition from Yahoo and Microsoft in particular rising over recent years, Google has had to pay more to retain its prime placement in various browsers.

Regardless of the recent changes, TAC remains far higher for third party sites than for Google’s own, though that’s not to say that this somehow translates directly into margins. Obviously, Google’s other costs for running its own sites are much higher than its cost for running ads on other people’s websites. But I suspect the increasing dominance of Google’s own sites as a source of ad revenue is driving the steady improvement in margins we’ve seen over recent years.

The downside of all this

Let’s turn now to the second reason all this matters. Though I’ve just said that the increasing dominance of Google’s ad revenues by money from its own sites is likely good for margins, there’s a downside here too. The problem with this dominance is that Google has to be responsible for essentially all the growth itself, largely by growing its direct audience and finding ways to sell more ads at higher prices. As we’ve already seen, YouTube has been a huge help here in recent years as monetization has really taken off, but I wonder how sustainable that growth will be over time. Google is already attempting to drive revenue through alternative business models like YouTube Red and other subscriptions, and I suspect we’ll see more of this.

But as long as Google is so heavily dependent on revenue from its own sites, it’s going to have to find new sources of revenue which it owns, which might well drive it to make acquisitions (Twitter, perhaps?) and organic investments in new properties. That may be challenging over time, especially as more and more online activity takes place on mobile devices, where there’s simply less room for ads. Better targeting and more lucrative formats like app install ads should help offset that a bit, but it may still be tough to sustain over time. Though Alphabet and Google’s recent results have been very positive, there is here still the core of a bear case against continued growth along the same lines.

Quick thoughts: Defragmenting media on Facebook

Facebook seems to be working on two fronts to bring content from third party sites natively into the Facebook experience. This began with video, where Facebook has been quietly bringing both major traditional brands and smaller content creators into the core Facebook experience. But there are now reports that Facebook plans to do the same with news articles from major publications like the New York Times, Buzzfeed, and National Geographic.

I’ve talked previously about the video efforts, and in that piece I said this:

Facebook has become a massive destination for video, but almost all the video is actually hosted on other platforms. That obviously has cost advantages for Facebook, but it means that it doesn’t own the content, and therefore can’t monetize it effectively. It also means that engagement around videos on Facebook is fragmented, with popular YouTube videos attracting millions of comments scattered across hundreds of thousands of different user shares of the same video.

There are lots of aspects to all this, and Facebook is no doubt talking up the performance and monetization benefits of publications hosting their content directly on Facebook. But I think one of the other key benefits is the ability to overcome this fragmentation, and that applies just as much to news as it does to video. So let me expand on that a bit. The problem as things work today is that there’s no single version of either a video or an article on Facebook, just the original on the third party site. Meanwhile, there could be thousands of individual shares of that video or article on Facebook, with no connection between them. On the third party site there might be an indication of the number of third party shares, but the site has no easy way to digest what’s happening on each of those shares, and Facebook users have no visibility into how many shares, comments or other metrics the article or video is capturing in total across Facebook. Sometimes Facebook takes an article shared my multiple friends and bundles it into a single card with a single link, but there are still two entirely separate discussions happening among two separate groups of friends.

What Facebook could do if these things were being shared natively through Facebook is start to aggregate all this activity much more effectively, both for the content owners and for users, with commenting, stats tracking and so on happening much more effectively. And of course Facebook could share much more data about the users sharing the content with the content owners, so that they’d get a much better picture of who’s viewing the content. One of the key challenges with Facebook (in contrast to Twitter) is that sharing is inherently private, which provides almost zero visibility for content owners. With native sharing on Facebook, that could change, though of course it raises some interesting privacy implications. If you’re commenting on my video or article on Facebook, does that mean I now get to see your comments, even if they’re only shared with your friends and not public?  And in a world where many news sites have either switched off comments or left them on but failed to curate them effectively, could Facebook help to provide a better class of discussion?

There are so many aspects to all this, including some significant risks for the brands involved. But it seems to me that they would at least in part be making the following tradeoff: ceding control over hosting and branding the content itself in favor of better visibility and tracking of the engagement with that content. For some of them, at least, I’m guessing that’s a tradeoff worth making.

YouTube and its alternatives

Eric Blattberg at Digiday has been doing some great work reporting on both some of the newer video initiatives at Facebook and Vessel as well as developments at the current industry powerhouse, YouTube. Eric’s latest piece today is about YouTube’s new effort to clamp down on sponsorships and advertising which bypasses its official ad products, and it’s this that I wanted to cover briefly today. I have two things I want to talk about: firstly, the potential of the newer video platforms; secondly, what Google’s YouTube moves suggest about the company as a whole.

Potential for newer platforms

I’ve been broadly skeptical of some of the newer video initiatives out there – YouTube’s lead has seemed so enormous, its position as the de facto standard for online video so entrenched, that it was hard to see how others could make a dent. Several things are starting to change my mind about this.

Firstly, Facebook’s embrace of video, and especially auto-playing video, has leveraged its massive audience into a very strong position as a video player. I’ve written elsewhere recently about the fact that every major sharing platform slowly migrates from text-based to photo-based to video sharing, but none has pursued this transformation quite as effectively as Facebook. From last month’s earnings call:

Five years ago, most of the content shared on Facebook was text and some photos. Today, it’s primarily photos with some text and video. Over the next five years, we want to keep developing new products and features to help people share the way they want.

Two things have allowed Facebook to make this leap to prominence as a video provider: the massive base of users, an the fact that Facebook is a destination, somewhere users go to spend time, rather than get something specific done. In the process, Facebook has become a massive destination for video, but almost all the video is actually hosted on other platforms. That obviously has cost advantages for Facebook, but it means that it doesn’t own the content, and therefore can’t monetize it effectively. It also means that engagement around videos on Facebook is fragmented, with popular YouTube videos attracting millions of comments scattered across hundreds of thousands of different user shares of the same video. This is starting to change, with ABC News, The Young Turks and others launching videos directly to Facebook rather than exlusively through YouTube. I think Facebook is finally in a position to be the first really large-scale platform to seriously challenge YouTube for dominance in video. The biggest challenge will be how to incorporate advertising into videos when they auto-play – pre-roll clearly isn’t the answer, but what is?

The other thing is that YouTube, with moves such as those Digiday covered today, is actually making it tougher for content creators to monetize on YouTube in the way they see fit. Videos on YouTube generate tiny amounts of money per view for content creators, and one of the ways they’ve overcome this challenge is through sponsorships. That’ll now be banned under YouTube’s new terms of service regarding advertising. At the same time, Vessel, AOL and others are targeting YouTube content creators with an emphasis on better monetization of their viewership. I’ve been skeptical of these efforts, but YouTube is playing right into their hands with some of these moves, which makes me more open to the idea that it might actually start to suffer as a result of competitive inroads from Facebook but also these smaller platforms.

What all this says about Google

Which brings us on to what this all says about Google. YouTube’s management must understand the risks associated with these moves, so why are they doing this? The only thing I can think of is that YouTube’s revenue growth has become so critical to Google’s overall performance that they have to keep squeezing harder and harder to get more money out, despite the longer-term strategic costs. Because Google doesn’t break out performance by business, we have essentially zero visibility into YouTube’s performance, but it’s been one of the strongest growth drivers for the company for years, and as the other parts of the business face increasing headwinds, it’s all the more important that YouTube continue to deliver strong growth.

On the positive side, YouTube’s management under Susan Wojicki is clearly thinking about how best to monetize much of the usage on the site that currently goes unmonetized or under-monetized. That includes YouTube Music Key and the work YouTube is apparently doing on building subscription models for content creators. The challenge is that almost all the moves YouTube is making are either content-creator-friendly at the cost of being user friendly (charging for content users have been receiving for free) or hostile to content creators. There’s very little that YouTube is doing which seems likely to please both users and content creators. I’m curious to see what else we see from YouTube in the coming months, but my worry is that Wojicki has been sent in to crank the handle on revenue in the short term and that this will have long-term strategic costs as other video platforms snatch away both viewership and content creators.