Category Archives: Surface

Every device is a compromise, part 2

In May last year, when Microsoft unveiled the Surface Pro 3, I wrote a piece about the new device but also about the way it was unveiled, titled, “Surface Pro 3, like every other device, is a compromise.” In that piece, I wrote about Microsoft’s insistence that the Surface Pro 3 was a no-compromise device, when in fact all devices represent compromises of one sort or another. I went on to say:

The biggest change in Microsoft’s Surface strategy over the last several years has been the locus of the compromise it’s still inevitably making. The first Surfaces were intended to be good tablets first and good laptops second (and ended up being neither). But with the Surface Pro 3, Microsoft has created a competitive laptop first, and a compromised tablet second. But it’s still pretending that there’s no compromise, and that is why the Surface line will continue to perform poorly. At some point, Microsoft has to stop pretending that a single device can meet all needs and start optimizing for different use cases with different devices, just like every other manufacturer.

Fast-forward to today, and we got the next version of the Surface Pro, the Surface Pro 4. And we saw two of the same phrases from that first event repeated: “no compromise” and “the tablet that can replace your laptop. So far, so predictable.

But then, immediately after the SP4 was introduced, we were shown the Surface Book. Which is a laptop. And Panos Panay, the presenter, started out by talking about all the things a laptop does that the Surface Pro does poorly – a better typing experience, a bigger screen, and so on. This was one of the most bizarre juxtapositions I’ve ever seen at a tech event. After 30 minutes of talking about how the Surface Pro 4 could replace your laptop with no compromises, the very same presenter offered up a laptop which was clearly better, because it didn’t make certain of those compromises.

Taking a step back for a minute, both products look really promising. I’ll withhold final judgment until I get to use these devices (or at least until others I trust have done so and shared their opinions). But this “no compromise” nonsense continues to do a massive disservice to Microsoft and to its customers. As I said in that earlier piece, every device involves a compromise. That compromise might involve features, functionality, look and feel, size, weight, price, or any number of other elements. But every device does involve compromises. And instead of pretending that it doesn’t, Microsoft needs to embrace what’s distinctive and best about each of the devices it offers. However, when you look at the Surface Pro 4 and Surface Book side by side, you start to realize that the Surface Book is really just the concept of the Surface Pro taken to its logical conclusion – thin, light, with a detachable keyboard and pen.

Is there anything that the SP4 does better than the Surface Book? Yes, it’s slightly smaller, and quite a bit lighter than the Surface Book if the keyboard is attached. To my mind, the only benefit to the SP4 is that it’s cheaper – in other words, it’s an inferior but more affordable version of the Surface Book. By the end of the Surface Book demos, I saw people asking on Twitter, “why does Microsoft even need the Surface Pro 4?” and as far as I can tell, the answer is “because the Surface Book starts at $1499”.

One quick comment on OEMs. Unlike the Surface, with which Microsoft said it was creating a new category, and therefore has somewhat been able to skirt around the fact that Microsoft is now competing with its partners, the Surface Book was not burdened with any qualifiers. It was simply positioned as the best, the thinnest, the most powerful Windows 10 laptop. Period. If I’m one of Microsoft’s OEM partners, I’m betting I’m not very happy about that at all. However, those OEMs have only themselves to blame if Microsoft, which has zero experience in making laptops, is able to produce a more compelling computer than the OEMs that have had decades of experience. What does it say about Microsoft’s OEM partners that Microsoft has been able to do this to them, and that it’s willing to do so? The one saving grace is that the vast majority of Windows PCs are sold at well under $1500, and so this really isn’t targeted at the core of the Windows PC market. But it’s still a finger in the eye of the Windows OEMs.

Lastly, this parting thought. Satya Nadella took the stage at the end of the event and gave the kind of speech he’s given at almost every event Microsoft has had since he took over as CEO – big picture themes, Microsoft’s mission statement, and so on. I’m a fan of Nadella, but this speech felt like so much waffle after what was a really compelling set of device introductions. All the energy seemed to go out of the event when he took the stage. The other thing that happened was that, as he mentioned them, I suddenly remembered that Microsoft had introduced a new Band and the Lumia 950 devices earlier in the event. I had almost completely forgotten those by the time the Surface stuff was over with. They were so completely overshadowed by what came after, and for all Panos Panay’s attempts at enthusiasm about the Lumias, it was very clear that he had inherited those products and his true loves were the Surface products. I might still write about the Lumias separately at some point, but for now I see little in them that’s going to transform the fortunes of Windows Phone or Microsoft’s phone hardware business.

A deep dive on Microsoft’s Q2 2015 numbers

Following Microsoft’s earnings is always interesting, because like any other company it releases many of the key data points in its press release, but to a greater extent than others it releases lots more little details in its regular quarterly SEC filings. And once a year, the 10-K provides an additional set of very interesting data. As such, I often hold off on writing analysis of Microsoft’s earnings until all these details are out. This piece builds on past pieces on Microsoft’s earnings, in some of which I’ve laid out the methodology I use for calculating some of the revenue numbers for individual businesses. Last year’s deep dive following the release of the 10-K is here.

Note: here as elsewhere on this blog, I use calendar quarters rather than companies’ fiscal quarters in my commentary and in charts. The only exceptions in this piece are specific references to Microsoft’s fiscal years (denoted as FY 2015 etc.)

Because this is a longer post, I’ve provided some links to specific sections below:

Employee numbers paint a stark picture of the Nokia acquisition

I’ll start with some of the stuff that Microsoft only reveals once a year in the 10-K, and that’s employee numbers and a product-level breakdown of external revenues.

From an employee perspective, the overall number is always interesting by itself, but this time around I found the categorization of the workforce particularly interesting. The three charts below show this split both by job function and by geography.

This first chart gives you some sense of the overall numbers as well as how they break down. As you can see, the workforce two years ago was just under 100k, but a year later it was almost 130k. What happened? The acquisition of Nokia’s devices business (NDS) is the main answer. But of course, since the acquisition Microsoft has pared back that workforce quite a bit. As I wrote in my piece on the Nokia impairment a few weeks ago:

By the time it’s done with the layoffs announced today, Microsoft will also have jettisoned around 80% of the employees associated with the Nokia acquisition. It took on around 25,000 (down from the 32,000 originally anticipated) when the acquisition closed, but laid of around half three months later, in July last year. Now, a year later, it’s losing another 7-8,000, taking the remainder down to just 5,000, or 20% of those originally brought on board.

Some 25,000 of that 29,000 bump from June 2013 to June 2014 was Nokia-related, but by June 2015 the number was back down to 118,000, or 10k lower, but that’s the net impact after hiring in other areas. The most dramatic impact from a job function perspective was manufacturing and distribution, which is shown in light blue at the top of the columns below, and is broken out separately in the second chart below. It’s also worth noting the strong growth in the Product Support and Consulting category during the last two years – this is organic hiring to support some of Microsoft’s newer businesses, and it’s accelerating rapidly. The third chart shows a geographic breakdown, and there too you can see the dramatic impact of the Nokia acquisition on overseas employees (up 25,000 exactly from 2013 to 2014) and subsequent loss of 8,000 of those employees a year later.

Stacked employees by functionEmployees by function Employees by geographyProduct revenue breakdowns

I always do quite a bit of reading between the lines every quarter to establish estimated figures for various product lines, but once a year Microsoft gives us a breakdown of “external revenues” from major product lines. This is about the only way to build a complete picture of products lik

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