Category Archives: Wearables

Four Quick Thoughts on Snap’s Spectacles

Over the weekend, Snapchat (now Snap, Inc.) announced its video-recording glasses, Spectacles. In talking to reporters on Saturday and spending some time pondering the move, four main thoughts have been running through my brain. I think we’ll almost certainly spend a good amount of time on this week’s Beyond Devices Podcast discussing this, so look out for that episode on Thursday morning.

Two takes on hardware for immersive video

Firstly, it’s interesting to see Snap and Facebook both investing in more immersive video, while also making hardware investments in this space. However, they’ve chosen different focal points for their hardware:

  • Facebook is encouraging people to use their smartphones to capture 360° photo and video, but has chosen to make its hardware investment on the consumption side (Oculus)
  • Snapchat has made a hardware investment in a capture device for 115° video, but the consumption will happen on smartphones.

That reflects a broader strategic focus for each company, with Facebook focused not just on video but on owning the next big platform after missing out on owning smartphone hardware and operating systems, while Snapchat is redefining its identity (see below). Neither company, obviously, is precluded from eventually moving into the other hardware space over time either.

Snap Inc, the camera company

While speaking at a Columbia University startup event in April, Evan Spiegel first began referring to Snapchat as a camera company, and that was now obviously a setup for the Spectacles launch, which has been in the works for at least two and a half years, and Snap Inc has embraced this tagline as its official self-description now too. This redefinition makes sense – there have always been several ways to look at Snapchat: a content company, a social company, an app company, or a camera company. Of those, three still make sense as descriptors after the Spectacles announcement, but what Snap clearly doesn’t want to be seen as anymore is just an app company. But the camera identity makes in some ways the most sense – it’s the first thing users see when they open the app, and snapping and sharing pictures and video is clearly the central purpose of the company.

One of the things Snapchat has done amazingly well since its founding is evolving out of its original narrow pigeonhole into something much broader. Though known in its early years mostly for the ephemeral nature of the content shared through the platform, and thereby gaining a reputation as being somewhat shady, its identity is now very different. The additions of Stories, Discover, Lenses, and a variety of other features has turned it into something much broader, which consequently captures much more of its’ users time. Spectacles, though, are arguably the first addition to the portfolio that isn’t in and of itself about getting users to spend more time in the app, and that’s interesting.

Inevitable comparisons to Google Glass

You can’t launch a video-recording pair of glasses in today’s world without drawing comparisons with Google Glass. But the target demographic, the price point, the design, and the intent are all very different for Spectacles compared with Glass. In addition, the Snap team had the benefit of learning from what went wrong with Glass.

It’s also interesting to think about where the Spectacles technology came from – thanks to the Sony email hack, we know that Snapchat acquired Vergence Labs in March 2014 for around $15 million. Vergence sold video-recording eyeglasses under the Epiphany Eyewear brand, and actually launched before Google Glass. But there were some important differences between EE’s glasses and what Snap has now launched:

  • The price ranged from $300-500 based on storage, versus Spectacles at $130
  • The glasses required a USB connection to plug into a computer for uploading videos to a proprietary hub, from which content could be shared to various social networks, versus sharing over Bluetooth or WiFi direct to a phone running the Snapchat app
  • The glasses had a subtler design, with just one camera discreetly tucked in the corner, versus Spectacles’ yellow-rimmed cameras in both corners.

Interestingly, though, Vergence had this quote on its website when asked about the differences versus Google Glass: “Glass appears to have a few more “electronics features” and we have more “eyewear features”.” This is a great summary of the difference between Snap’s Spectacles and Glass too – the former is a pair of sunglasses that records video, while the latter was technology strapped to your face.   There’s definitely much less of a cyborg vibe to Spectacles. The Spectacles do own their role as cameras – those yellow rims are clearly intended to highlight the presence of the cameras, and lights will further highlight when you’re actually recording. Snap has obviously learned from the privacy concerns around Glass.

Why hardware?

The biggest question in mind throughout all this has been why Snapchat would undergo this transformation from an app company to an app plus hardware company, because that’s a tough transition to make. Consumer electronics involves industrial design, manufacturing, shipping and retail, break-fix capabilities, and much else besides, which an app company never needs to worry about. The business model is very different too – the incremental cost of serving an additional user with an app is close to zero, whereas the incremental cost of selling another unit of hardware is significant. Moreover, the vast majority of Snapchat’s end users have never paid it any money for anything in the past, and will now be asked to stump up $130. Given that for many of Snapchat’s users, their disposable income is probably best described as pocket money rather than a salary or even wages, that’s probably a tough sell.

Two obvious reasons present themselves: business model and differentiation. On the former front, Snapchat’s main business model has been advertising, so hardware revenue can provide a useful additional revenue stream while also hedging against any future challenges in driving ad revenue. But a proprietary camera also allows Snapchat to differentiate itself in much the same way its software Lenses already do. The Spectacles have a unique field of vision and video format, which in turn will be uniquely available in the Snapchat app, and that’s not to be underestimated.

Having said all that, we’re likely talking about a small production run here, which means the risks involved will be limited. If the product takes off, Snapchat can presumably churn out tens of thousands and make lots of money. If it doesn’t, it won’t hurt its financial performance too much (though the big bet on changing the name and identity of the company may look a little hubristic later if that’s the case). The big question is whether Snapchat can actually make money selling these glasses at $130 a pop, when Vergence Labs was selling their predecessors for more than twice that, and Snap’s version has two cameras and two wireless chips.

It’s also interesting to consider what else Vergence Labs was working on at the time of the acquisition – there were three future projects listed on the website at the time: smarter transition sunglasses, a HUD for heart-rate tracking during exercise, and an AR application. Those and others (especially given the dual cameras) are possible future directions for Snap’s glasses efforts too.

Refocusing the Apple Watch

As part of my media comment on the Apple event, I talked a little about how Apple has rethought the Watch since its initial introduction two years ago. That thought deserves a deeper dive, and although we did discuss it a little on the Beyond Devices Podcast this week, I wanted to elaborate here. The word that I keep using in talking about what has changed is that Apple has refocused the Apple Watch, and it’s done that in two ways:

  • It’s refocused the feature set of the Watch
  • It’s refocused the Watch portfolio.

Refocusing the feature set

When it comes to the feature set, Apple famously introduced the Watch with an echo of the original iPhone announcement, with a tripartite identity:

  • the most advanced timepiece ever created
  • a revolutionary new way to connect with others
  • a comprehensive health and fitness companion.

Though the health and fitness companion came last on that list of three, it’s rapidly risen to the top in terms of how Apple talks about the device today. Tim Cook referred to it this week as “the ultimate device for a healthy life.” Meanwhile, the communication aspects (represented in that second bullet point above) have faded into the background, barely mentioned in this week’s keynote.

But the other thing that’s been de-emphasized in the refocusing of the Apple Watch is apps, and that’s because apps just haven’t worked on the Watch. In September 2015, Tim Cook described what I refer to as Apple’s playbook for hardware devices in the iPhone era, with a set of bullet points:

  • Powerful Hardware
  • Modern OS
  • New User Experience
  • Developer Tools
  • App Store.

It’s clear that, both at its initial unveiling and a year later, Apple saw the Apple Watch as another product that fit this model, under which developer tools and the App Store would be critical to its success. I argued at the time that it would have been impossible for Apple to introduce a new piece of hardware in 2015 which didn’t tap into the App Store model, and yet I’m no longer sure of that view. Apps have largely flopped on the Watch. The reasons are simple – the hardware has been underpowered, and under watchOS 1 in particular apps were too dependent on the phone. But even in watchOS 2, Watch apps were too slow to load, because they didn’t maintain state and didn’t update in the background.

WatchOS 3 is intended to fix at least some of these issues, and the CPU and GPU upgrades in Series 2 of the Watch are aimed to improve app performance too. But Apple still didn’t make apps much of a focus at this week’s event. In other words, even with these potential enhancements to app performance, Apple is still focusing most of its messaging around the Watch on fitness features. I suspect that, instead of saying “this time we really got it right” after versions 1 and 2 fell short, Apple is going to quietly give developers time to figure this out, and then perhaps next time around we’ll see a renewed emphasis on how apps are adding value to the Watch. Pokemon Go and other high-profile apps may well help with this effort, but Apple is trying very hard not to oversell it this time around, and I think that’s smart. This particular form of crying “Wolf!” is running dangerously close to falling on deaf ears at this point.

The Apple Watch Hourglass

What I think we may see as a result is a sort of hourglass on its side, as in the diagram below:

apple-watch-hourglass

The Apple Watch started out trying to be another micro computer. But Apple has now narrowed the focus to mostly being a great timepiece and an increasingly capable fitness device. In time, though, as the apps enhancements kick in and Apple works on other areas like Health in more depth, we may well see the purpose and positioning of the Watch become more expansive again.

The near-term implications of that are important to note: this means the addressable market for the Watch for the time being is mostly about a combination high-end fitness tracker and digital watch, rather than the broader “small computer” market which the iPhone and iPad arguably inhabit, and which is enormously larger. This, in turn, means that the Watch is likely destined for modest, incremental growth over time, rather than the sort of explosive growth that characterized both the iPhone and iPad in their early years. But as Apple begins to think about the Watch more expansively again, so the addressable market will begin to expand, and the sales potential of the Watch will grow with it.

Refocusing the portfolio

The original Apple Watch portfolio had three distinct tiers, with the Watch the core tier, the Sport the less expensive aluminum version, and the Edition the high-end luxury version, with prices to match. The price ranges for this original portfolio are shown in the chart below:

Apple Watch Pricing April 2015

Two important things to note: the enormous separation between the Sport and Watch versions on the one hand and the Edition on the other, and the sheer height of the Edition portfolio’s pricing, topping out at $17,000. That’s a 48:1 ratio between the most expensive and least expensive Watches.

Fast forward a little over a year and you have the new portfolio announced this week, with a slimmed-down Apple portfolio and two partner versions of the Watch as well. For comparability with the chart above, here’s a view of the new pricing to the same scale:

apple-watch-pricing-september-2016-scale-20k

And here’s a version with a scale that makes more sense for today’s Watch pricing (note that the axis tops out at exactly a tenth the price of the axes above):

apple-watch-pricing-september-2016-scale-2k

First things first: Apple has basically eliminated its ultra-luxury Watch Edition models. The only model that has this designation now is the white ceramic Watch, but that’s priced at roughly a tenth of the original Editions. The new price ratio, including the Hermès Watches which actually top out slightly higher than the new Edition watch, is roughly 5.5:1 from most to least expensive. It’s also worth noting that the three Apple ranges are still mutually exclusive but now more or less touch each other — there are no more big gaps in the portfolio, even at the high end. The Series 2 aluminum Watches, starting at $369, pick up just above where the Series 1 Watches leave off at $299, while the Edition hits at $1,249, again just a little above where the Watches peak, at $1,099. The Edition branding still connotes exclusivity and premium materials and therefore satisfy the conspicuous consumption angle, but Apple is now targeting the low end of high-end watches rather than true luxury watches.

Apple now also has its two key Watch partners, Hermès and Nike, to fill in gaps in the portfolio. It’s interesting that we’re seeing these partnerships so early, but I suspect this is another sign that Apple recognizes the nature of this market and its growth prospects. What Apple is doing here is diversifying the portfolio by feature and function early in order to better saturate the smaller addressable market.

Beyond Devices Podcast

If you enjoy these posts, you’ll probably enjoy the Beyond Devices Podcast, in which Aaron Miller and I discuss events like this week’s Apple announcements, as well as other topical issues, and also answer questions about trends in technology.

Our most recent episode is embedded below, and you can find all past episodes on our website, on iTunes, on Overcast, and in other podcasting apps.

Thoughts on the Fitbit IPO filing

Fitbit, the company that makes a variety of fitness trackers, has filed for an initial public offering with the SEC, and its S-1 filing contains lots of financial and operating data for the past several years. There’s plenty here to dig into, but I want to focus specifically on the user numbers and what they suggest about abandon rates of these devices.

Revenues and margins

The first thing to note is that the headline financials look extremely good. Revenue growth is very strong, especially over the last couple of quarters (note that this is 4-quarter trailing revenue, to smooth out cyclicality):

Trailing 4 quarter revenue $mAs you can see, Fitbit’s revenues have risen from just over a quarter of a billion dollars per year in 2013 to almost a billion in the last four quarters, which is phenomenal growth. And it’s doing this without losing money – in fact, it’s enormously profitable (note that these margins are adjusted for the negative impact of the recall of the Fitbit Force in late 2013):

Fitbit adjusted marginsAs you can see, the company has very healthy net, operating and gross margins, which show no signs of falling. These revenue growth and margin metrics help to explain why the company is going for an IPO now – the numbers are very, very good. I would suggest that the launch of the Apple Watch also creates a trigger for this event: it both brings welcome attention to the sector, while threatening the concept of dedicated fitness trackers, so now is in some ways the perfect moment to IPO, while the sector is hot but before Apple’s entry causes problems. Perhaps even more importantly, the sector is only beginning to feel the effects of the Shenzhen ecosystem, and Fitbit today still clearly commands a significant price premium for its devices, one that will be increasingly difficult to maintain as cheap Chinese trackers enter the market.

User numbers and abandon rates

Definitions

To my mind, however, the various user numbers Fitbit reports were far more interesting, especially for what they suggest about how long people use Fitbit devices for after they buy them. Fitbit reports two different user numbers: registered users (reported on a fairly patchy basis) and paid active users (PAUs). The latter number is not quite what it sounds like, and that’s important here. Based on the definition in the S-1, a user only has to meet one of these three criteria within the preceding three months to qualify:

  • “[have] an active Fitbit Premium or FitStar subscription”
  • “[have] paired a health and fitness tracker or Aria scale with his or her Fitbit account
  • “[have] logged at least 100 steps with a health and fitness tracker or a weight measurement using an Aria scale.”

In other words, this is really just a measure of active users, incorporating those with paid subscriptions, those who have recently activated a device, and those who have recently used a device (with no double-counting). The only users that are excluded would be those who only use Fitbit’s dashboard without also using a Fitbit device (e.g. those manually entering activity or calorie consumption data).

Registered users vs. device sales

Let’s start with registered users (which is not defined but which I assume simply means those that have created an account at some time in the past). The first interesting comparison is looking at registered users against the total number of devices sold over time:

Registered users vs cumulative sales

What you see here is that the total number of registered users tracks very closely to the number of cumulative devices sold. In some ways, that’s not terribly surprising, but of course one important conclusion is that very few of Fitbit’s users have ever purchased more than one device. The difference between the two numbers at the four points in time we have available grows from under 500,000 to around 2 million over time. That’s probably not a bad proxy for the number of people who have bought more than one Fitbit device over time (though it’s not perfect – some may have bought more than two). That’s actually very small in the grand scheme of things – only about 10% of the total number of devices would have been sold to people who already had one.

Registered vs. active users

Let’s turn now to comparing registered and active users – if registered users are those who ever had a device, and active users are those still using one (plus the small number using a paid subscription), then this is a good indicator of the abandonment rate:

Registered paid users and cumulative salesAs you can see, the number of active users is far smaller than the number of registered users when added to that same chart. In the chart below, I’ve shown PAUs as a percentage of registered users at the four points in time where we have both numbers:

Paid users as percent of registered usersThe number bounces around at about 50%, rising or falling a little over time but remaining remarkably constant. In one sense, that’s obviously fairly bad news – in addition to the fact that very few Fitbit buyers purchase a second device, it would appear that half of those who bought one stop using it after a period of time. However, there’s a flip side to this, if you’re looking for a silver lining, which is that the number isn’t falling over time. In other words, over two years ago, the number was 50%, and it still is. I’m actually a bit surprised by this, because all the early abandoners should still show up in the numbers and drag the overall retention rate down, but that doesn’t seem to be happening. What’s interesting is that this correlates closely with a survey I did last year about fitness trackers. The key question here was the individual’s experience with fitness trackers:

Fitness tracker survey

As you can see, the 50% abandon rate suggested by the Fitbit numbers closely mirrors the results of the survey, with a 9%/11% split between former users and current users.

Recent device sales and active users

Another way to look at all this is to compare device sales and paid users (which was the first thing I did when the S-1 was released). We’ve already looked at the relationship between cumulative device sales and the active user base, but let’s drill down a bit. The chart below compares PAUs (in blue) with device sales over the prior 6, 9, and 12 month periods:Measures of base sizeThe line that correlates most closely with PAUs is the 6-month device sales number. This suggests that this may be a good estimate of how long people hold onto their Fitbit devices on average. That doesn’t mean every user abandons their device after six months – some clearly hold onto them a lot longer, while others likely abandon them more quickly.

What does this mean for Fitbit’s prospects?

We talked at the beginning about how well Fitbit is doing financially. It’s selling over 10 million devices per year at this point, growing rapidly, and making good margins on them. So, how important is this abandon rate information to our evaluation of Fitbit’s prospects going forward? Well, one could argue that at just 10 million sales per year, there’s tons of headroom, especially as Fitbit expands beyond the US (the source of around 75% of its revenues today). But in most consumer electronics categories, there’s a replacement rate for devices, which continues to drive sales over time even as penetration reaches saturation. The biggest worry in the data presented above is twofold: one, very few Fitbit buyers have yet bought a second device; and two, many don’t even use the first one they bought anymore. Once Fitbit maxes out its addressable market, it’s going to have a really tough time continuing to grow sales.

This, taken together with the threat of Chinese vendors invading the space with much cheaper devices, reinforces my perception that Fitbit is IPOing at the best possible time from the perspective of its existing owners and investors, but that its future looks much less rosy than its past.

This week’s Techpinions column – Apple and Mobile Payments

My column for Techpinions this week is about Apple and mobile payments, and was prompted by the current heightened interest in Apple’s plans in this area, driven both by the prospect of new iPhones and wearables. I quote survey results from my recent report on smartwatches, but also highlight the vicious circle that plagues the mobile payments space:

The mobile payments vicious circle

Aside from the overall challenges facing any company in the payments space, I talk about the major technologies Apple might choose to use, including both NFC and Bluetooth LE (Apple has so far favored the latter). You can read the whole thing on the Techpinions site. All my Techpinions columns can be seen here.

New report and post on smartwatches

My firm, Jackdaw Research, has just published a report for subscription clients on the topic of smartwatches, entitled Smartwatches: Market Prospects. It features several consumer surveys which gauge demand for current and future smartwatch features, and evaluates the current offerings in the smartwatch market. I’m bearish on smartwatches as they currently stand – demand for the features they offer is weak, and that demand is currently being met by weak supply too, as all of the current offerings are flawed by virtue of the compromises they make between battery life, displays, performance and usability. The market is likely to remain small unless something changes – one of those, of course, being a disruptive entry to the market by Apple.

My Techpinions post today summarizes some of the key findings of the report. Here’s a quote:

Measured against these criteria, the current crop of smartwatches on sale does very poorly. I did my own ratings as part of my report, and I ended up with scores which were barely above 50% across these seven categories. Unlike most reviewers, I don’t see the Pebble as the clear leader in this market – in fact, all the devices ended up clustered around a very small range of unimpressive scores. If we’re really honest with ourselves, we should expect much more of these devices before we embrace them, and unless they do more we’re not likely to see them sell above current levels.

The UK’s Guardian newspaper also did an extensive write-up on the report, which you can find here.

There’s more information about the report, and an opportunity to buy it directly, on the Jackdaw Research website. The report is available as part of our subscription research service for clients, and is $500 for non-clients.

Apple will make several wearables, but not a watch

Back in January, I did a post titled “Why Apple may not launch an iWatch anytime soon.” The gist of the piece was this: that Apple doesn’t enter markets particularly early, but rather enters at the point where the technology is ready for it to provide the kind of transformative product it’s used to disrupt the music player, smartphone and tablet markets in the past. At the time, my conclusion was that Apple would likely stay out of the wearables business entirely, until such time as the underlying technology was ready. However, given the other things we’ve seen from Apple in the last few months, I now believe it’s very likely we’ll see something in this category from Apple in the near future, but it won’t be a watch, and it’s likely that it will actually be several products rather than just one.

Smartwatches aren’t delivering on the promise, but the promise is flawed too

There are two big problems with the smartwatch market as it stands: firstly, the underlying technology doesn’t seem to be ready, which means it doesn’t deliver on the promise of the category. But secondly, the promise itself simply isn’t all that compelling for the vast majority of the general population. There’s a sense that if someone can just crack the smartwatch category it’ll suddenly explode, but I’m just not sure I agree with that. It still fundamentally seems like a solution in search of a problem at this point. But the coverage – as is so often the case – is driven by a very small number of people who likely are in the target segment and therefore talk up both the promise and the reality well beyond what’s justified.

A different approach solves some fundamental problems

For all these reasons, I’m still skeptical that Apple will release a product that’s identifiable as a watch. If I think about the thorniest technological challenge with smartwatches, it’s the fact that you’re having to squeeze both a fairly smart CPU and a decent display, and the battery to power them, into what has to be a very small form factor. That problem essentially goes away if you see wearables less as notification screens and more as off-device sensors, as Apple seems to, in contrast to Google:

Android Wear vs Apple HealthKit

If wearables are merely providing sensor extensions to the smartphone rather than trying to replicate smartphone functions, you can do away with the bright, big screen and the powerful CPU, and strip both down significantly. On some wearables, you might retain a small display, but it’s entirely possible that others would do away with it entirely. Put in the relevant sensors, a Bluetooth LE radio and a small CPU, and you’d be done. This would allow you to make the device significantly smaller and sleeker, make the battery last much longer, and also allow for many other form factors that could be worn in different places around the body. Continue reading

Why Apple might break its launch pattern with wearables

Apple has established a pattern over the last six years with regard to releasing SDKs to developers ahead of releasing new software and hardware products to customers. The original iPhone didn’t follow this pattern, not having an App Store and therefore no SDK either. But since March 2008, Apple has given developers several months’ lead time to create apps which are optimized for its newest hardware and software releases. The times between SDK release and customer availability of the related products is shown in the chart below:

iOS SDK to customer availability - 560px

The exact length of time between SDK release and customer availability has bounced around a bit. When new iPhones were released in June, the SDKs arrived first in March, and then in April, slowly whittling down the time available for developers to create apps. Then, in 2011, Apple moved the whole schedule back a few months, with SDK release in the summer, and the new iPhone landing in the fall, and it stretched out the time in-between at the same time, moving it back to around 130 days. The last two releases have both seen exactly 102 days from SDK to customer availability. When Apple last introduced an entirely new hardware category, in 2010, it gave would-be iPad developers just over two months’ lead time.

As we approach the possible launch of new hardware in at least one category (wearables) and possibly two (smart home), it’s worth thinking about how this pattern might apply to these new categories. What’s most striking this time around is that I think it’s entirely possible that Apple has already done the SDK releases that will power these devices, and we therefore won’t see the long delay between the announcement of new hardware and its availability to the public. Apple has already laid the groundwork for new wearable devices as follows:

  • In iOS 7, announced in June 2013 and available since September 2013, Apple tweaked the Notification Center and augmented Bluetooth capabilities to support better off-device notifications, for example on a smartwatch or similar device (Pebble and other third party smartwatches already make use of these)
  • in iOS 8, announced at this year’s WWDC and presumably available in September 2014, Apple created HealthKit and the companion Health app, which can capture data from sensors in wearables and store and analyze them for users.

As such, depending on Apple’s implementation of wearables, it’s possible that it’s already given developers all the tools they need to create apps that will take advantage of whatever Apple releases. There may not be an “iWatch” SDK as such. If that’s the case, we could see the pattern shown in the chart above blown away completely with the release of wearable devices from Apple. Or, put another way, Apple has already started the clock ticking by releasing the SDKs to developers, and now we just need to wait for the other shoe to drop. And of course, if you believe the rumors about the smart home, the very same pattern would apply there – the necessary tools are all already out there in developers’ hands in the form of HomeKit.

If Apple is indeed planning an iWatch rather than something similar, it might need an SDK of its own for the on-device display, but if – as I suspect – what Apple ends up releasing looks a lot less like a watch and more like a much simpler device, then I think all the pieces may already be in place. On Monday, I’ll talk more about why I think what Apple releases might not be a watch at all, and why I think there will probably be several devices rather than just one.

New podcasts

I’ve done two podcasts in the past week:

  • The Beehive Startups / Startup Daily podcast, which I occasionally guest on. This episode was recorded shortly after Apple’s WWDC, so we talked a lot about what Apple announced there, including HealthKit, HomeKit and Swift. We also talked a bit about Google’s self-driving cars.
  • The Techpinions podcast, where I’m a regular contributor (I also write a weekly column on the Techpinions site). We talked about E3 and consoles, PCs, and wearables. Some of the thoughts on smartwatches I’d previously shared in this post about the potential for an iWatch.

Happy listening!

Apple resurgent – thoughts on WWDC

Today’s WWDC keynote was a sign of a renewed swagger on the part of Apple, whose executives seemed to relish the deluge of new product announcements they unleashed on developers and on their customers. In the process Apple established or strengthened its competitive positioning against two major foes – Microsoft and Google – while opening itself up in unparalleled ways to developers. Today’s announcements may come to be seen in the same way as Steve Jobs’ original launch of Mac OS X, in that it lays the groundwork in several areas for years of future Apple products.

The demotion of Google continues

Two years ago at WWDC, Apple removed erstwhile close partner Google from the iPhone in two significant areas: as the backend provider for the Maps app, and in the form of the pre-installed YouTube app. But Google’s last major bastion on iOS is its position as the default search engine in Safari, and it’s much harder to remove there. In the sense of typing a query into a search box or address bar in a browser, hitting enter and being presented with a screen of blue links, Google is unrivaled, and Apple knows that. But it has slowly been inserting itself between the user and that search box over the last couple of years, and today’s keynote provided further evidence of Apple’s pre-empting of the Google search on both iOS and OS X devices.

Apple’s more subtle disruption of the user-Google relationship began with the launch of Siri, which began to address some users’ queries without an explicit search, and which uses Wikipedia, Wolfram Alpha and Bing, but not Google, as underlying search providers. And it has continued since then, as more third party services have been layered into Siri, pre-empting the Google search for movie listings, restaurant reservations and sports scores. Today’s keynote added Spotlight search to the list of places where users will now find answers to their queries without the classic search box experience, thus further inserting Apple between users and Google.

This is potentially significant for Google, for which the US continues to be easily its single biggest and most lucrative market, and for which mobile is increasingly important. To the extent that iPhone users, which make over 40% of US smartphone users, start using Apple and its tightly integrated third party services instead of Google, for search, that’s pretty bad news. That isn’t, of course, why Apple is taking these steps, but it’s an unpleasant side effect for Google. And a great way for Apple to participate in the search business without having to match Google in the page-of-blue-links business.

A device for every need, not one device for every need

Continue reading

Why Apple may not launch an iWatch anytime soon

Everyone seems to assume that Apple is working on an iWatch, an entry in the emerging smartwatch market, and it’s likely that it is. But a secondary assumption has been that this launch must be imminent, because of the other entrants in the market, notably Samsung. However, the history of Apple’s entry into new markets shows that it bides its time, rarely entering right as a market begins, and often waiting until the combination of technologies required has evolved to the point where they’re ready for a truly compelling product. The chart below shows the timelines for Apple’s entry into three previous product categories, those which fueled much of its growth from 2000 to the present:

Apple product timelines Continue reading